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ABSTRACT
Media policy in the United States has, since its inception, been governed by the
principle that infrastructure providers should serve "the public interest." The
Federal Communications Commission has traditionally been charged with
enforcing various obligations on businesses under this principle. Policymakers
have developed different regimes for different media, but these distinctions no
longer make sense in a technologically converged environment.
This study draws upon the historical origins of the principle in order to inform
contemporary debates in communication policy. It recovers some of the
normative meaning behind "the public interest" phrase, and identifies the several
dimensions in which it remains relevant today. The thesis argues that universal
access, platform innovation, and general-purpose technologies should inform
network-aware media policy.
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INTRODUCTION
There is something special about communication. There is something about
communication that propels it beyond just the domain of hallowed private enterprise and
into the domain of public interest. At least, that is the theme of several hundred years of
governance. Perhaps it is no longer true.
The contours of "the public interest" have never been cleanly delineated, and they
have been even less consistently articulated. Nevertheless, there is a principle,
originating in English common law and persisting in current American statute, that
"businesses affected with the public interest" take on certain social responsibilities
enforceable by the law. Lord Hale most famously articulated this idea in a seventeenth-
century tract, explaining that certain types of private property can become "affected with
a public interest, and they cease to bejuris privati only."' He noted that a variety of
businesses have rightfully been viewed in this way-including wharves, inns, and
bridges.
Something special about these businesses in particular caused courts to
superimpose a degree of public jurisdiction over private enterprise. Some have described
how examples to date include an element of common calling-that they in some way
"hold out" service to the public at large.2 Many of these services became known as
"common carriers," in a distinction that persists today. Other scholars have discussed
how these special businesses all exhibit a degree of potential monopoly control, acting as
1 Sir Matthew Hale, De Portibus Maris, reprinted in A Collection of Tracts Relative to the Law of England,
ed. Francis Hargrave (London, 1787) 78.
2 Joseph W. Singer, "No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property," Northwestern
University Law Review 90 (1996): 1304-1321; Charles K. Burdick, "The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of
Public Service Companies, Part I," Columbia Law Review 11.6 (June 1911): 514-531.
exclusive gatekeepers that suppress competition.3 Both lines of analysis seem persuasive
in part. However, as I will discuss, the historical examples also resist those attempts to
nail them down.
Despite this difficulty of definition, American communications law places the
public interest at its core. The phrase appears nearly a hundred times in the current
version of the Communications Act. When the Federal Communications Commission
promulgates rules, its orders are peppered with references to the public interest. Indeed,
the ultimate backstop from Congress is that the FCC must justify all rules as serving the
public interest - whether they apply to copper wires, wireless, cable, or otherwise. Public
interest obligations developed in the US for physical transportation by railroad have been
translated into virtual transportation of communication.
The challenge for regulators, innovators, and citizens is to understand what this all
means in the context of an ever-convergent communications landscape. Regulators can
make mistakes both when they overbear and when they forbear. Innovators can be stifled
by ill-conceived restrictions in the name of public interest and can equally be blocked by
ill-intentioned competitors. Citizens can miss their participatory potential in a
consumption-focused environment and a read-only mentality. A rich sense of the public
interest requires understanding its well-worn history as well as the unique affordances of
our burgeoning network society.
Over the last century, the public interest has justified a variety of specific policies.
The earliest radio regulations focused on public safety and required operators aboard
ships to ensure effective emergency communication. As broadcasters began to interfere
3 Bruce Wyman, "The Law of Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem," Harvard Law Review
17.3 (1904): 156-173.
with each other's signals, the government stepped in to issue exclusive operating licenses
in exchange for somewhat arbitrary demonstration of valuable public service. This
model of licensing in exchange for trusteeship was used to promote various goals through
the 1960's, including diversity of programming, localism, political discourse, children's
programming, limits on advertising, and more.4 Meanwhile, wireline regulation
developed its own set of public interest guidelines. These included the idea that carriers
may not discriminate between communication sources, they should serve (or "build out"
to) all citizens, they must interconnect with other carriers, and their prices must be
government-controlled to avoid over-charging in the monopoly environment. Over time,
some of these principles were de-emphasized in favor of a focus on generating more
robust competition and efficient use of scarce resources. Clearly, contemporary policy
cannot simultaneously embody all of these historical principles to the same degree.
The internet offers a fresh opportunity to consider the relevance of the public
interest in communication policy. It presents a moment of media change in which we
must reformulate the government's role in defining and promoting a public interest
standard. In this sense, it is a moment of technological transition that mirrors the
electrification of communication, the invention of broadcasting, and the proliferation of
cable. Early regulators struggled to describe what it was that imbued radio waves and
telegraph wires with public significance. The internet operates using the infrastructure of
some of these technologies, but it also transforms the ways they are used. Both copper
and coax provide telephone, video, and web service through a unified Internet Protocol.
Wireless and fiber fill out different extremes of the broadband speed spectrum. By some
F4 or a comprehensive review of this history, see Erwin Krasnow, "The 'Public Interest' Standard: The
Elusive Search for the Holy Grail," Federal Communications Law Journal 50.3 (1998): 605-635.
measures, competition and convergence have brought us into an age of boundless
abundance. 5 By other measures, we are still a far cry from a universal virtual agora, and
the forces of control threaten the public benefits we are just beginning to realize.
One theme that stands out in this centuries-old debate is worth noting up front.
The public interest in transportation and communication has never been entirely about
markets and competition. To be sure, this has been part of the debate. Nevertheless,
commentators have long strived to describe something more. The public interest doctrine
in American law grew up in parallel with antitrust law, and at times the two became
intertwined.6 Even in the early "public interest" articulation in the 1876 case, Munn v.
Illinois,7 discussion of "virtual monopoly" crept into the analysis. I aim to highlight the
more elusive and social side of public interest regulation while also refining its
economically grounded rationales.
In recent years, many have declared the end of the public interest standard, or at
least the death of its justifications. They often take aim at the public interest standard as
it appears in broadcast regulation, claiming that it was doomed from the start. Ronald J.
Krotozynski, Jr., remarks, "The sad truth ... is that the Commission's attempts to
implement the public interest standard . .. are a portrait of regulatory failure,
notwithstanding the good faith efforts of virtually every subsequent Chairman of the
Commission." 8 Right-leaning free-market advocates like Adam Thierer argue for a zero-
S See, for example, United States, Depart. of Commerce, "Networked Nation: Broadband in America 2007
National Telecommunications and Information Administration" (Washington: GPO, 2008), Available at:
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/2008/N etworkedNationBroadbandinAmerica2007.pdf>.
6 Willie A. Grieve and Stanford L. Levin, "Common Carriers, Public Utilities and Competition," Industrial
and Corporate Change 5.4 (New York: Oxford UP, 1996) 993-1011.
7Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 1876.
8 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., "The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public Trustee Model of Broadcast
touch policy, reasoning that "The public interest standard is not really a 'standard' at all
since it has no fixed meaning; the definition of the phrase has shifted with the political
winds to suit the whims of those in power at any given time."9 Thomas Streeter claims
that from the perspective of left-leaning Critical Legal Studies, the term is wrought with
"legal indeterminacy" and that "any assertion of the social good or the 'public interest'
necessarily involves what we ordinarily think of as 'subjective' contingency and
variability."'1 Conservative libertarians and liberal progressives agree: broadcast-era
public interest regulation is highly problematic. Although many of these critiques are
persuasive, it is not clear that they carry much force in the context of the internet. To
begin with, the idea of regulating in the "public interest" originated long before broadcast
media. 11 Furthermore, the internet presents a new cultural configurations and new modes
of communication. These may well bring new public interest considerations.
Our current media ecology is radically affected by the introduction of the internet.
The outcome of this disruptive force depends on the interaction of markets, norms,
architecture, and law.12 If there is anything worth preserving or adapting from the legacy
of public interest communication regulation, it must be considered in the light of how
Television Regulation Must Fail," Michigan Law Review 95.6 (May 1997): 2103-2138.
9 Adam Thierer, Media Myths: Making Sense of the Debate over Media Ownership (Washington, DC: The
Progress & Freedom Foundation, 2005) 100 <http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/books/050610 Omediamyths.pdf>.
'0 Thomas Streeter, "Beyond Freedom of Speech and the Public Interest: The Relevance of Critical Legal
Studies to Communications Policy," Journal of Communication 40.2 (June 1990): 48.
1" William D. Rowland, Jr., "The Meaning of 'The Public Interest' in Communications Policy, Part I: Its
Origins in State and Federal Regulation," Communication Law & Policy 2.3 (1997): 309-328. Rowland
explains that not only did the public interest standard have a far more well-established meaning than most
commentators claim, but it also bore the lineage of centuries of non-discriminatory rules. The broadcast
twist (or perversion, depending on one's perspective) "was a well-rehearsed doctrine, with a rather widely
understood practical meaning that had been emerging throughout the earlier stages of American industrial
regulation" (p. 315).
12 1 of course owe these distinctions to Lawrence Lessig, Code (New York: Basic Books, 2006).
these forces regulate the overall environment. The outcome does not depend only on
governmental regulation or economic forces but on their interactions with each other and
with cultural and institutional forces. Right now is a critical point of media in transition
that will affect the shape communications ecosystem going forward. As Paul Starr notes,
"At times of decision-constitutive moments, if you will-ideas and culture compel into
play, as do constellations of power, preexisting institutional legacies, and models from
other countries."' 13 This is now one such moment.
Broadly, there are three fundamental questions that I seek to address in this paper.
First, should the elusive notion of "the public interest" have any relevance whatsoever in
current communications policy? Second, how does the medium of the internet connect to
and transform the media-specific public interest implementations of the past? Third, how
do the cultural norms of the internet inform core public interest principles in
contemporary policy debates?
In Part I, I sketch the historical development of the public interest standard from
medieval common law to the present. This includes its first appearance in constitutional
law stateside, as well as the roundabout way it was incorporated into the Communications
Act. I touch on early articulations in broadcast radio, and then television, as the FCC
established various requirements for use of the "public airwaves" and the "common
carriers." I describe how technological advance provided more frequencies for use and
more "pipes" into the home, which in turn was used to justify a deregulatory market-
based approach in the second half of the century. The internet experience provides a
novel and remarkably successful model, with decentralized agents interconnecting under
13 Paul Starr, The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern Communications (New York: Basic
Books, 2004) 2.
an ethos of openness. The internet is simultaneously exceptional and dependant upon old
technologies, norms, markets, and law. I ask whether it offers an opportunity to
constructively update our notions of the public interest.
In Part II, I outline several contemporary regulatory debates about broadband
policy, with the hope of bringing public interest considerations to bear. Scholars,
policymakers, and engineers have recently been having heated arguments about whether
and when content discrimination might be appropriate in the network. This includes what
has been called "network neutrality,"' 14 as well as various types of "network
management" that can optimize scarce bandwidth but also place speech-dampening
power in the hands of commercial gatekeepers. A similar set of questions arises in the
area of spectrum allocation. In this case, the FCC must choose which entities have a right
to use valuable frequencies for new broadband services, and under what terms. The
Commission has embraced both auctions and unlicensed use and continues to experiment
with different models in the name of the public interest. Finally, I describe the current
discourse around a possible "national broadband strategy." Many have called for a
comprehensive approach to national broadband deployment that is informed by other
countries, but the US faces a paucity of data about existing deployment as well as a
lagging political will to take substantial action other than deregulation.
In Part III, I describe some preliminary principles of public interest that are
informed by the internet experience. While these focus primarily on broadband policy,
they are designed to be ubiquitously relevant in an increasingly IP-based, technologically
14Tim Wu, "Why Have a Telecommunications Law?: Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communications,"
Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law 5.1 (2006): 15-46; Tim Wu, "Network
Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination," Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law 2
(2003): 141-179.
converged media landscape. I first discuss how we need to move from the legacy notion
of "universal service" and its politically co-opted bureaucracy to an approach that
emphasizes unitary and universal access. Many-to-many access, not one-to-many
service, needs to be at the heart of our understanding of publicly valuable
communication. Furthermore, this access needs to be unitary in the sense that access at
any point implies equal access to the whole network. Second, I discuss how we need to
move from purely static competition analysis to a more holistic dynamic innovation
perspective. This involves recognizing the disadvantages of concentrating control of
communication, even in the hands of rational market actors. Such a shift understands that
radical economic growth comes endogenously from the network. This necessitates a re-
envisioning of traditional competition law. Finally, I explain that controlled-use
communication technologies must give way to general-purpose platforms. Such an
approach places innovative and expressive power in the hands of users (citizens) and
enables emergence of remarkable new modes of production and creation.
I. THE HISTORY OF BUSINESSES AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
In 1930, two accomplished legal scholars offered interpretations of what it meant
to be "businesses affected with the public interest." In the pages of the Harvard Law
Review and the Yale Law Journal, respectively, they laid out justifications for
governmental regulation in the public interest. Breck P. McAllister explained that the
concept historically focused on the type of the business at hand." On his telling,
15 Breck P. McAllister, "Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest," Harvard Law Review,
43.5 (March 1930): 759-791.
transportation-related businesses most frequently triggered public interest obligations,
especially when they were offered to all. McAllister's former professor Walton H.
Hamilton responded that what really mattered now was whether the business had a
degree of monopoly control. He conceded McAllister's telling of history, but explained
that the shifting meaning was simply the common judicial practice of "putting new wine
in old bottles." The living law changes, he explained. Common sense and judicial
opinion now stated that "whenever enterprise ceases to be free, therefore, the matter
becomes of public importance."' 6 In short, McAllister thought that public interest had
historically been applied based on the nature of the business, whereas Hamilton thought it
should now be based on competition analysis. McAllister indicated that the historical
justifications may be outmoded, and Hamilton insisted that economic analysis should
become the exclusive criteria for interventions.
This was not simply an abstract discussion amongst theorists. In the early
twentieth century, legislators and policymakers were trying to understand their public-
oriented mandates in the context of a raft of new laws and regulatory agencies. The
Interstate Commerce Commission had been established to regulate railroads (and then
telegraph and telephone), and parts of its mission sounded remarkably similar to those of
the newly created Federal Radio Commission. Antitrust legislation was being updated,
and the "trust busting" movement was in full swing. The language of "public" airwaves,
rights-of-way, and trusteeship intermingled with the debate over how to protect against
powerful industrialists. Deciding how the government should regulate such businesses
16 Walton H. Hamilton, "Affectation with Public Interest," Yale Law Journal 39.8 (June, 1930): 1107.
involved wrestling with the somewhat competing definitions of "public interest"
presented by thinkers like McAllister and Hamilton.
A. EARLY FORMULATIONS 17
1. Common Law
Behind the debate stood centuries of common law. David Bogen has traced the
legal notion of a "public calling" for innkeepers. 18 As early as the fourteenth century it
was customary to accept any traveler, but the legal requirement to do so was not well
established until the seventeenth century. There was a sense of overall public interest in
ensuring that travelers would be housed fairly and safely, not turned out into the night.
Eventually the law established that if a bed was available the innkeeper could not pick
and choose his patrons. Similar "public calling" obligations required blacksmiths to shoe
horses in a damage-free, non-discriminatory fashion. 19 Bogen explains that in a key 1624
resolution of the court, "Justice Chamberlaine noted that simply by putting up a sign and
lodging travelers, an individual became liable to an action on the case for refusing
someone shelter." 20 As custom became common law, the detailed reasons for public
calling obligations on these particular businesses were never worked out in detail.
17 1 should note at the outset that Thomas Nachbar's work immeasurably informed this section and indeed
was my inspiration for delving more deeply into the history of these precedents; see Thomas Nachbar, "The
Public Network," March 2008 Working Draft, CommLaw Conspectus (Dec. 2008), pending
<http://ssrn.com/abstract = 1009641>.
18 David S. Bogen, "The Innkeeper's Tale: The Legal Development of a Public Calling," Utah Law Review
51 (1996): 51-92. Bogen's thesis is that the requirement to serve evolved largely because it was necessary
to support the enforcement of liability on innkeepers for the guests they had accepted. If innkeepers were
to be made to assume responsibility for their guests' safety and property, they must not be able to turn
guests away simply for demanding that protection. Thus, Bogen argues that although non-discriminatory
service eventually became assumed in its own right (and innkeeper liability faded), the principle evolved in
an indirect way that allowed it to take hold without more explicit articulation of its justifications.
19 Lane v. Cotton, 88 , Eng. Rep.1458 (K.B. 1701).
20 Bogen 88, cited as "Resolutions Concerning Innes, 123 Eng. Rep. 1129 (1624)."
Meanwhile, another class of businesses was also being described in terms of the
public interest-transportation carriers. A touchstone from English law has been jurist
Matthew Hale's 1670 description of port facilities, bridges, ferries, and the like as being
private businesses that are nonetheless "affected with the public interest."2' Hale
explained that in the case of ferries, a person may set up a ferry for private and exclusive
use, but if that service is offered generally to the public it becomes subject to public
interest obligations. Likewise, port facilities, such as a public wharf "unto which all
persons that come to that port must come and unlade or lade their goods," 22 bear the
responsibility to serve all, in equal fashion, under reasonable terms. 23 Implicit in the
description of these businesses is consideration of the nature of the business
(transportation infrastructure), whether or not it is offered to the general public ("held
out"), and the state of competition for the service (whether "all persons that come to that
port must come [emphasis mine]" 24 to that proprietor). As we shall see, these
distinctions provide ample fodder for public interest regulation and debate through the
present.
Common law continued to define which trades were subject to public interest
obligations and which were not. Services that involved carrying goods became grouped
under the term "common carrier," and businesses such as inns were often listed alongside
these examples. 25 By the nineteenth century, other businesses that were thought to have
21 Hale 78.
22 Hale 77.
23 "I. They [ports] ought to be free and open for subjects and foreigners, to come and go with their
merchandise.... 2. There ought to be no new tolls or charges imposed upon them without sufficient
warrant, nor the old inhanced.... 3. They ought to be preserved from impediments and nuisances" (Hale
84).
24 Hale,77,.
25 For an extensive accounting of the history of this development, see William Jones, "The Common
Carrier Concept as Applied to Telecommunications: A Historical Perspective," appendix to the Reply
been "held out" to the general public, such as the "common" tailor and surgeon, clearly
did not bear the duty to serve.2 6 Oliver Wendell Holmes noted in 1881 that applying non-
discrimination requirements on all businesses would be "monstrous" 27 - presumably
because to do so would compel service that infringed on practitioners' rights in cases
where services were not critical to social well-being. The duty to practice with care was
upheld across most business (via contract or tort), but the obligation to serve all comers
non-discriminately survived only for a handful of practices. Innkeepers and common
carriers became the quintessential examples.
The idea that a business can be affected with the public interest appears
prominently in American law in the 1876 case of Munn v. Illinois.28 In an era of
increasing governmental oversight of industry, the courts were struggling with how to
square these state interventions with the constitution. The case itself dealt with a series of
grain warehouses on the harbor in Chicago, which served as a staging area for shipping
via the Great Lakes. The court explained that the warehouses stand "in the very 'gateway
of commerce,' and take toll from all who pass." The court considered the business to be
of the same nature as common carriers, innkeepers and the like-citing Lord Hale at
length and even going so far as to say that the proprietors exercised "a sort of public
office." It noted that the owners of the various warehouses agreed on prices, and enjoyed
a "virtual monopoly." Thus, Munn v. Illinois gives ample resources from which to build
Comments of International Business Machines Corporation in Competitive Carriers Rulemaking, CC
Docket No. 79-252 (filed 4 April 1980).
26 Nachbar, 25.
27 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1881) 203.
28 Munn v. Illinois.
a theory of public interest regulation based on public holding-out of service, market
power, the nature of the business, or some combination of the three. 29
2. Justifications and Obligations
Similar positions surface repeatedly in the public interest debate, and they are not
mutually exclusive. The first school of thought, that obligations apply to businesses that
"hold out" services to the public, goes back to the earliest attempts to enforce responsible
innkeeping. Some scholars have extended this theory to explain why other types of
"common" practitioners may have been subject to obligations to serve indiscriminately.
Adherents to this approach claim that the various "common" trades by their name implied
public interest obligations-that somehow being a "common cook" meant a person was
conducting a general public service. 30 Other versions of this argument contend that
particular businesses by their nature constitute a "holding out."
This "holding out" explanation has some allure. It is certainly true that business
dealings between a private or limited group of entities would not trigger public interest
obligations. On the other hand, there are innumerable businesses that have "held out"
service to the public but not been subjected to the full range of public interest obligations.
This would indicate that holding-out (explicitly or implicitly) is necessary but not
sufficient to being "clothed in the public interest." If that is the case, there must be more
to this standard.
29 I am indebted to Nachbar for his articulation of these distinctions.
30 See, for example, both Burdick and Singer.
One line of reasoning emphasized from Munn v. Illinois on is premised on
monopoly control, or at least on undue market power.3' If consumers do not have the
choice that a competitive environment would provide, they are likely to be cheated or
denied service. This monopoly control can come in the form of economic monopoly or
government-granted monopoly. In an economic monopoly, the monopolist maintains
exclusive control over a service or resource purely based on its own market power.
Government-granted monopolies, on the other hand, typically take place under grant of
franchise to the monopolist, which comes with conditions. Lord Hale's treatise clearly
focused on port facilities, which in his time were almost always monopolies of some sort,
and he acknowledged this. Commentators have claimed, sometimes with thin evidence,
that most "public interest" businesses exercised market power.3 2 Munn v. Illinois
provides ample space for this argument in its "virtual monopoly" language.
Still, it is not clear that public interest obligations at common law were motivated
primarily by market considerations. Certainly innkeepers were not always local
monopolists. 33 The monopoly language in Munn v. Illinois may be incidental to the
primary finding, and some have surmised that it was primarily a rhetorical device in an
environment that was generally hostile to monopolists. Nachbar notes that "Although
market power has frequently received prominent rhetorical placement in
nondiscrimination regimes, market power has been neither a necessary nor a sufficient
3 Hamilton believes that this factor may have been central to the majority's reasoning in Munn v. Illinois,
but McAllister does not. In any event, it clearly became emphasized afterward.
32 Wyman's central claim is that monopoly is the critical factor, but his article cites little evidence and
instead relies on dubious assertions.
33 "Resolutions Concerning Innes," 123 Eng. Rep. 1129 (1624).
condition for imposing nondiscriminatory access on an industry." 34 It may even have
been "read into" the case after the fact more strongly than it was intended. It is no
coincidence that the monopoly argument gained traction in an era of Progressivism and
trust-busting. Antitrust law did not claim the same roots for its justification, but it
nevertheless became intermingled with transportation and communications regulation.
The 1912 United States v. Terminal Railroad Association decision mandated access to
"essential facilities" based on its antitrust grounding.3 5 Different degrees of market-
oriented oversight led to different degrees of government intervention. The monopoly
language provided no hard and fast distinctions, and some have argued that it led
overseers to assume that private interests always aligned with public interests. 36
If neither "holding out" nor monopoly control alone determine which businesses
are affected with the public interest, perhaps we should look to the nature of the
businesses involved. This third approach is more subjective, but also potentially more
productive. There are some striking commonalities between the businesses that have
been placed in this special category. To be sure, some of this is due purely to the self-
reinforcing nature of the law-history tends to be perpetuated. However, Thomas
Nachbar makes a strong case that most of these businesses have to do with transportation
34 Nachbar 61.
3 ' United States v. Terminal Railroad Association, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) and 236 U.S. 194 (1915); the
"essential facilities" language was not in fact used in the case, but rather developed after the fact. The
essential facilities doctrine has significantly fallen out of favor in recent years, and in Verizon v. Trinko,
540 U.S. 398 (2004), seems at risk of being banished entirely from telecommunications law.
6' Willard D. Rowland, Jr., "The Meaning of 'The Public Interest' in Communications Policy Part II: Its
Implementation in Early Broadcast Law and Regulation," Communication Law & Policy 2.4 (1997): 363-
397. "During the century-long period before the enactment of broadcast radio law, the public interest
standard came to be interpreted widely by administrative agencies and the courts as a doctrine to insure the
economic well being of the regulated industries" (p. 364). Rowland notes that this view was supported by
the utopian vision of a new class of "enlightened business man" and that Hoover's Radio Conferences
typified this stance.
or communication infrastructure. This helps to explain why it was so natural for courts
to translate regulations focused on exchange of goods into exchange of expressions. If
this line of reasoning holds, then we must ask what it is about communication
infrastructure that makes it different from other businesses. I argue that the distinction is
indeed more fundamental than "holding out" or market power. Regardless, public
interest justifications appear to fall into some combination of these three categories:
* "holding out ". the provider has made an implied promise to serve
* market power/"virtual monopoly ": little competition leads to market failure
* special type of business. transportation and communication are infrastructure
Ultimately, the dilemma of how to constitutionally justify state intervention was
rendered moot in Nebbia v. New York (1934).37 The government was granted broad
power to regulate wherever it deemed necessary. Nevertheless, the core idea that
communications infrastructure is unique continues to influence policymaking. In order to
understand how to regulate, if at all, we need to understand why communication has been
so valued that we have been willing to impose a degree ofjuris publici on private
property.
Identifying the historical justifications for public interest obligations is only the
first step. The second step is to explore the nature of the obligations themselves.
Impositions on transportation and communication infrastructure have generally involved
the requirement to serve everyone, and to do so equally. This was true of early
innkeeping law, eighteenth century common carriers, and the telegraph. Serving
everyone seems like a relatively straightforward requirement-either a business is doing
'7 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
so or it is not. However, the ability to discriminate in the price, order served, or quality
provided makes the problem considerably more complex.
Throughout much of history, this problem was dealt with through explicit price
controls and requirements to serve all comers in the same fashion. Detailed price-setting
was not foreign in medieval common law because the king routinely set prices for many
types of goods. However, as centralized control relaxed - and especially as business
grew in the United States amidst different public sentiments about governmental control
- price-setting became less widespread. Near the turn of the twentieth century,
transportation and communication companies grew to such size that they became national
or regional monopolists, and the government had to confront the question of what to do in
order to protect consumers and support the free exchange of ideas. This set off the series
of regulatory reactions I outline in the next section. Even then, the transit of goods and
information was largely a commodity service offered uniformly or, in the case of
broadcast, a monopoly-granted license with content rules. It was not until the internet
entered the picture that dilemmas around differentiated services, order of service, and
quality of service came to the forefront.
3. The Roundabout Route into the Communications Act
As outlined above, the Supreme Court decision in Munn v. Illinois set the stage
for federal regulation of transportation infrastructure. The fact that the grain elevators
stood at the gateway of commerce, specifically interstate commerce, gave the federal
government the toe-hold necessary to intervene. The social practice of equal service
begat English common law, which in turn made its way into American case law. In
1887, the legislature created the first federal regulatory agency: The Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC).
The ICC was granted broad jurisdiction to regulate interstate commerce and was
explicitly given a mandate to regulate the railroad business. Railroad companies had
continued to grow in size, and there was increasing concern about their business
practices. 8 Railroads had become critical to transportation of food and supported any
number of other businesses. States had developed some limited regulatory structures.
However, Congress had neither the railroad-specific expertise nor the ability to conduct
close long-term scrutiny. The solution on the federal level was to create the ICC as an
"expert" body with the power to promulgate detailed rules within the bounds of their
broad authority. The Interstate Commerce Act declared, among other things, "That it
shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act to make or
give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person... ."39
The common carriage principle became established in American transportation law at the
same moment that the country embarked on its first experiment with a federal regulatory
agency.
The Interstate Commerce Act would be amended many times in the years to
come. There were several shortcomings from the perspective of Congress. For one, the
Act did not give the Commission as much enforcement power as expected, which was
being challenged in court. For another, other industries began to be seen as parallel to
38 Bruce Wyman, "The Rise of the Interstate Commerce Commission," Yale Law Journal 24.7 (May 1915):
529-543.
3" Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 (24 Stat. 379), approved 4 Feb. 1887, sec. 4.
railroads. Interstate pipelines were added to the agency's jurisdiction, as well as
communications lines.
The 1910 Mann-Elkins Act outlined the ICC's jurisdiction over telephone,
telegraph, and cable communications (whether wired or wireless). Some states had
already exercised degrees of oversight over these industries. Congress decided that the
federal agency could and should oversee the interstate portion of the businesses. The Act
added communications carriers to the list of common carriers and included some specific
exceptions for rate-discrimination based on customer-defined classes of service ("day,
night, repeated, unrepeated, letter, commercial, press, Government, and such..."). 40
Apparently some members of Congress who focused on railroad policy expressed
concern about incorporating this new industry into the bill, but the non-discrimination
principles proved analogous enough that the new jurisdiction survived through passage.
That same year, Congress also saw fit to regulate wireless communication in the
interest of public safety. In the Wireless Ship Act of 1910, it required all sea-faring
vessels to have radio equipment and an operator on board. This time, it placed
enforcement in the hands of the Commerce Department. However, amateurs and
"professionals" often crossed paths on the air, with the amateurs occasionally annoying
the others with their banter and the newcomers frustrating the amateurs with their poor
Morse code skills.4 1 By 1912 most commercial and navy vessels included a radio set and
an operator for communicating with the shore and calling for help. The Titanic was one
of these ships. When the boat collided with an iceberg on April 10, 1912, a series of
4(' Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 (24 Stat. 379), approved 4 Feb. 1887; amended 1913, section 8563.
41 Susan J. Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 1899-1922 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1987)
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radio communication failures meant that rescue vessels missed calls for help and that
messages incorrectly reported that all passengers had already been saved. There is a
range of explanations for these failures-including the fact that nearby boats' radio
operators were asleep rather than attending the radio set-but ultimately the amateurs
were most aggressively blamed. It was perceived that they had a role in transmitting the
false messages of rescue. Whatever the causes, the Titanic disaster was the clear impetus
for the Radio Act of 1912, passed only three months later.42 The Act relegated amateurs
to limited space in the short wave spectrum and set the precedent for government
regulation of the airwaves in the future.
As World War I consumed the nation's focus, the government took control of
both the airwaves and the railroads. It standardized the equipment across different rail
lines and enforced strict requirements on the use of radio. When the country emerged on
the other side of the war, Congress was faced with a question: turn control back over to
railroads and communications companies, nationalize the industry, or do some
combination of these.43 For companies that had been governed by the Interstate
Commerce Commission, it was decided that they should be allowed to re-take control of
their assets on the condition that they further unify their different lines. Mergers were
encouraged based on the idea that that there was a clear national benefit to a unified,
interoperable system. The Transportation Act of 1920 provided the guidelines. It also
explained that mergers must be proposed to the Commission, which would hold a public
hearing. "If after such hearing the Commission finds that the public interest will be
42 Douglas 216-239.
43 "Partial Merger of Roads Favored: Interstate Commerce Commission Opposes Return to Anti-Pooling
Conditions," The New York Times, 6 Dec.1918, 14.
promoted by the consolidation and that the conditions of this section have been or will be
fulfilled, it may enter an order approving and authorizing such consolidation."44
Things were not as well prescribed in the area of radio regulation. Commerce
Secretary Herbert Hoover was leading ad-hoc rulemakings without clear direction from
Congress. Hoover had proposed that Congress go beyond the limited scope of the 1912
Act and transfer full control over radio policy to the Department of Commerce, which
shared decision-making power with the Post Office and the Navy. He did not succeed in
this effort, but through a series of annual radio conferences he started in 1922, the
department slowly developed as the de-facto rule-maker. Hoover decided upon the terms
of using radio frequencies and chose which entities received licenses. At the 1925
conference, he stated, "the choice is between public interest and private desire, and we
need not hesitate in making a decision. .... The use of a radio channel is justified only if
there is public benefit."A5 Private companies were viewed as public trustees of the
spectrum, and the radio frequencies were given only in service of the public.
Nevertheless, the businesses at the table were rapidly turning radio from many-to-many
conversations to one-to-many broadcasts. As Paul Starr explains, "Radio fit [Hoover's]
agenda perfectly in the early twenties, when he saw his role at Commerce as fostering
economic growth, including the promotion of new industries." 46
Although Hoover used the language of public interest, he framed it in terms of
serving "the great body of the listening public," and noted, "there is no proper line of
44 The Transportation Act of 1920, approved 28 Feb. 1920
<http://laws.lp.findlaw.com/getcase/us/258/204.html>.
44 Fourth Radio Conference, 1925, qtd. in Streeter 57.
46 Starr 333.
conflict between the broadcaster and listener." 47 William D. Rowland, Jr., explains that
these twin assumptions emphasized ratings-based market analysis and implicitly assumed
that business profitability equaled public benefit.4 8 Jessie Walker notes, "Established
broadcasters, looking to reduce competition, wanted the government to limit the number
of licenses it would issue. They had a friend in Hoover." 49 The 1925 conference decided
to stop granting any new licenses whatsoever, claiming congestion of the airwaves.
However, Zenith contended that the conference had no such jurisdiction. When a court
sided with Zenith and the Justice Department agreed, all regulations to date were
invalidated and the spectrum was flooded with interfering broadcasts. 50 Starr explains:
The resulting cacophony produced the impetus for change that Hoover had
been unable to provide on his own. This was the second generative crisis of
radio regulation. As the sinking of the Titanic had precipitated the Radio Act
of 1912, so the anarchic deregulation of 1926 finally jolted Congress into
action. 51
Congress faced a dilemma when trying to translate the license-granting conditions
into formal process. What really was the standard for choosing one applicant over
another? How could the law define the seemingly subjective criteria? Hoover's "public
47 Fourth Radio Conference, 1925, qtd. in Newton N. Minow and Craig LaMay, Abandoned in the
Wasteland: Children, Television, and the First Amendment (New York: Hill and Wang 1995) 73.
48 Rowland, 11 371.




interest and private desire" language was somewhat attractive. Senator Clarence C. Dill
gave the following account much later:
A young man on the committee staff had worked at the Interstate Commerce
Commission for several years. . . and he said, "Well, how about 'public
interest, convenience and necessity'? That's what we used there." That
sounded pretty good, so we decided we would use it, too.52
In short, the "public interest" language from the Interstate Commerce
Commission was "close enough" and it solved a practical wording problem. It did not,
however, specify exactly what it all meant. Instead, the Radio Act of 1927 created the
Federal Radio Commission, an expert agency designed to consider the details. This set
up the structure, and the tension, of broadcast regulation for decades to come. Unlike
common carriers, license holders could exclude all others from using their channel. 3
Rowland claims that this reinforced the notion that "the public interest lay in the
combination of technical capacity (solve the interference problem) and economic
strength." 54 Media theorist Ithiel de Sola Pool sees this as the moment when government
went astray from the fundamentals of communications regulation.
It was not until the 1920's however, that communications policy in the United
States most seriously lost its way. Without adequate thought, a structure was
introduced for radio which had neither the libertarian features of the common
carrier system nor those of the free market. The assumption of the new
52 Minow and LaMay 4.
53 Rowland, HI, notes that in the 1925 Conference's final recommendations, Hoover and the industry
representatives pushed for the benefits of monopoly control without the obligations that traditionally came
along with public utilities: "That those engaged in radio broadcasting shall not be required to devote their
property to public use and their properties are therefore not public utilities in fact or in law; provided,
however, that a license or a permit to engage in radio communication shall be issued only to those who in
the opinion of the Secretary of Commerce will render a benefit to the public" (p. 372).
54 Rowland, 11 377.
system was that spectrum was extremely limited and had to be allotted to
chosen users.
Of course, it was not solely the regulators that pushed radio toward a one-way
format dominated by highly produced programming. The nature of the broadcast
technology and the facilities costs propelled license holders toward that model. In 1922,
AT&T had obtained the license to operate WEAF in New York City. They saw radio as
an extension of their telephone business, and adopted a common-carrier like approach in
which anyone could air their message to the public for a fee. Starr notes that, "the
common-carrier conception, however, not only overestimated the demand at that time for
such a service; it also ignored the interest of a broadcaster in building up its audience by
airing programs of dependable quality." 56 Within a few years, the antitrust authorities
began to develop concern about AT&T extending its market power to this new medium,
and the company negotiated a deal to sell the station in 1926.
Meanwhile, many claimed that the Interstate Commerce Commission was failing
to keep up with its duties with respect to telephone and telegraph. As the FRC gained
jurisdiction over all wireless communication, it made less sense that the ICC work in
parallel. In the Communications Act of 1934, the FRC became the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), and gained control over the communications
industries formerly overseen by the ICC. Telephone and telegraph were classified under
the Communications Act's "Title II - Common Carriers" whereas the language of the
1927 Act fell under "Title III - Radio." The "public interest" language of English
common law had been woven into American case law, cross-pollinated from the
55 Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom (Cambridge, MA: Belknap-Harvard UP, 1983) 232.
56 Starr 337.
common-carriage statutory structure into broadcast, and reunited in the Communications
Act of 1934.
B. TOWARD ABUNDANCE
As the Communications Act went into effect, communications techfnology was
already starting to outpace it. Advances in telephony stretched the detailed regulations
that governed it. New forms of radio modulation offered better listening experiences, and
ultimately visual radio - television. Later, coaxial cable emerged as a way to transmit
radio via the same spectrum but through controlled, non-interfering wires. All of this
added a measure of abundance to the relatively limited capacity of the first generation of
channels. By the end of the twentieth century, this shift was used as a justification to
undo many of the regulations traditionally explained in terms of the public interest.
1. Carriers, Trustees, and Franchises
The peculiar structure of the Communications Act generated distinct "silos" of
regulations, based on the technology at hand. Telephone and telegraph, as well as other
"telecommunication" services, stayed under the purview of Title II. Here, the traditional
common carrier arguments were the strongest, and the FCC promulgated detailed rules
about rates and practices. For a long time, it was simply assumed that these services were
a "natural monopoly" in which competition would fail. How many competitors could be
expected, after all, to build out the facilities and put copper wires in the ground to every
home? The government maintained that it was far more efficient to simply maintain non-
discriminatory rules such that AT&T could not pick and choose whom customers could
call. They were also subject to wide-ranging rate regulation. This ultimately facilitated a
certain degree of competition, at least in the long-distance market. In the 1970's,
companies like MCI developed nationwide backbones, which AT&T customers could use
by first calling a special access number. In the local and last-mile access market,
however, competition has only recently come in the form of cellular and cable telephony.
The non-discriminatory obligations of common-carriers sparked other innovations
as well. The landmark 1968 Carterphone decision by the FCC allowed customers to
attach any device to the phone network, as long as it did not harm the network. The
familiar black rotary phone gave way to a variety of devices. Machines began to use the
phone system to communicate with each other. Fax machines and modems were clearly
a harbinger of things to come. Common carriers saw a business opportunity in this
development and sought to charge more for access to dial-up services such as Lexis-
Nexis or stock brokerages. Others wondered if the FCC would step in and regulate the
practices of those dial-up services themselves. In a series of decisions, referred to as the
Computer Inquiries, the FCC distinguished between "basic" and "enhanced" services.
Basic services were the traditional common carrier transport services. Those would
continue to be regulated under non-discriminatory rules, which would bar the phone
company from charging more for calling particular numbers. Enhanced services included
the various dial-up services, and the FCC explicitly chose to forbear from any regulation
of the services themselves. Indeed, it is unclear that they would have had the jurisdiction
to regulate something that was not transport.
In Title III - Radio, the dominant rationale continued to be public trusteeship.
The airwaves were a common public good, but the reality of interference meant that the
government needed to coordinate its use. In 1927 the Commission had begun to grant
licenses based on a determination of the "public interest," and it would go on to explain
in 1928 that this was "a matter of comparative and not an absolute standard."5 7 A year
later it further explained that programming should meet the "tastes, needs, and desires of
all substantial groups among the listening public,"" 58 among other things. The
Commission continued to use this reasoning to deny licenses to "propaganda" stations,
scam-artists, and hateful speakers. 59
The question of what constituted "the public interest" dominated rulemakings for
decades to come. The FCC issued the so-called "Blue Book" in 1946, which tried to
explain the proper balance of types of programming, and released a "Policy Statement" in
1960 that sought to formalize these criteria.
The trusteeship rationale of broadcast regulation is perhaps best exemplified in
FCC Chairman Newton Minow's 1961 speech to the National Association of
Broadcasters, in which he said, "Gentlemen, your trust accounting with your beneficiaries
is long overdue. Never have so few owed so much to so many." 60 Minow was frustrated
with what he saw as a "vast wasteland" when he tuned across the dial. Undoubtedly
there was some amount of trivial content in prime time, and some edifying content that
was never aired. However, the task of determining which was which was proving to be
very difficult, and enforcement was close to impossible. Krotozynski claims that "the
5: Statement by Federal Radio Commission Relative to the Public Interest, Convenience or Necessity, 2
FRC Ann. Rep. 166 (1928), qtd. in Krasnow, n. 20.
5" Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 FRC Ann. Rep. 32 (1929), affirmed in part and reversed in part, 37 F.2d
993 D.C. Cir., cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
59 For an insightful account of this period, see Hal Abelson, Ken Ledeen, and Harry Lewis, Blown to Bits:
Your Life, Liberty, and Happiness after the Digital Explosion (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Addison-Wesley,
2008) 260-273.
6" Newton N. Minow, "Television and the Public Interest," speech to the National Association of
Broadcasters (9 May 1961).
public trustee model of commercial broadcasting is doomed to failure because it is
largely antithetical to the commercial interests of broadcasters and virtually incapable of
being vigorously enforced." 6 1 The fundamental model of broadcast was for broadcasters
to choose what consumers could see, and it was not clear that the government was going
to do a better job. Nevertheless, in 1969, the Supreme Court would uphold the FCC's
authority to determine content restrictions on licensees, citing the public interest. 62
By the end of Chairman Minow' s tenure, a new technology was emerging - cable
television. In some ways, cable looked like a mixture of common carriage and broadcast.
It took a common carrier-like technology (wires) and used it toward a broadcast end (one-
way transmission). During the 1960's and 1970's, the Commission struggled with where
cable television fit its mandate. Regulations were ad-hoc and often focused on cable's
role as a repeater of weak broadcast signals. 63 Indeed, Patrick R. Parsons explores the
struggle to define cable in the late 1950's and stated that its regulatory status as either
common carrier or broadcast was the battleground between industries.64 As he describes
it, the key fight was to attempt to create a "taken-for-granted" vision of a specific media
system. By the time the Supreme Court debated the constitutional status of cable
television in 1986 (City of Los Angeles v. Preferred, 476 US. 488), it first sought to better
understand the nature of the medium. Parsons explains that framewoks for understanding
media are constructed via social practice. In the case of cable, the powers at work
61 Krotoszynski 2122.
62 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 1969.
63 FCC Cable TV Fact Sheet, June 2000 <http://www.fcc.gov/mb/facts/csgen.html>; Ozro William Childs,
IV, "The FCC's Proposed CATV Regulations," Stanford Law Review 21.6 (June 1969): 1685-1713.
64 Patrick R. Parsons, "Defining Cable Television: Structuration and Public Policy," Journal of
Communication 39.2 (1989): 10-26.
successfully defined cable as analogous to broadcast in its social role, thus enabling
regulatory flexibility when its rules for use became codified in policy.
Cable companies required rights-of-way in places where they sought to put wires
into the ground, and localities used this fact to extract certain concessions. Through
individually negotiated franchise agreements, many cities gained a percentage of annual
cable revenue as well as access to a limited number of channels for "public" use. In
1972, advocate Theadora Sklover explained the public access ethos: "We're not here to
editorialize or make decisions about what people can say over the air."65 The FCC
asserted its authority to require cable operators to provide channels to "public,
educational, and government" channels (PEG) through a series of rulemakings. Public
access would remain the closest thing that television had to common carriage, but its
quality and relevance would be questioned for decades.
In 1984, Congress clarified the FCC's mandate in cable television with the
passage of the Cable Act. The Act added a "Title VI" in the Communications Act (Titles
IV and V contained administrative details), thus establishing yet another technology-
specific regulatory silo. Where cable interacted with broadcast, the Commission
exercised its jurisdiction to require cable systems to carry local programming (the so-
called "must carry" rules). Much of Title VI dealt with franchising and addressed the
places where federal, state, and local jurisdictions intersected. Title VI as originally
drafted did not contain reference to the "public interest" per se, but one of the stated goals
was to "assure that cable communications provide and are encouraged to provide the
65 Theadora Sklover, qtd. in Ralph Engelman, "Origins of Public Access Cable Television 1966-1972,"
Journalism Monographs 23 (Oct. 1990).
widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the public."66 For better
or worse, this did not carry the content-level regulatory force that Title III imposed on
broadcast. After all, cable carriers were not as clearly public trustees. Furthermore, cable
had been socially defined as distinct from common carriage, unlike the telephone
companies in Title II. Franchising was the most obvious toe-hold for regulators, but it
was also a highly decentralized structure.
2. More Channels and Bluer Skies
The 1984 Cable Act codified the medium as regulated separately from broadcast
and common carriers, but the lead-up to its passage affected the framing of
communications regulation as a whole. As a technology, coaxial cable had been in use
since the 1950s for receiving and retransmitting distant signals within small communities.
In the late 1960's, the dominant term shifted from "Community Access TV" (CATV) to
simply "cable." Thomas Streeter has documented how a new discourse developed
around this time, rich with rhetoric about how the globally connected multi-channel
universe of cable would enlighten society as a whole. 67 Throughout this so-called "Blue
Sky" era (which lasted into the early 1970's), commentators advocated a utopian view of
the technology that resisted traditional governmental regulation. Cable corporations,
special interests, and free speech advocates with diverse motivations and expectations all
looked to cable as the solution to our communication ills. As Streeter notes, the president
took notice: "Cable offered what seemed to be a major outlet for [Lyndon] Johnson's
progressive hopes. Cable could increase citizen participation, allow repressed minorities
66 Cable Act, Sec. 601.
67 Thomas Streeter, "The Cable Fable Revisited: Discourse, Policy, and the Making of Cable Television,"
Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 4 (1987): 174-200..
cultural and political expression, and generally help lead society toward a more
enlightened future." 68
Indeed, Johnson saw the current series of technological developments as an
opportunity to further the public interest. When the Carnegie Corporation offered to fund
a commission to investigate the future of public television, Johnson appointed the
members of the committee, saying, "From our beginnings as a nation we have recognized
that our security depends upon the enlightenment of our people; that our freedom
depends on the communication of many ideas through many channels." 69
In short, the country needed better content that was available through more
channels. The Carnegie Commission ultimately recommended the creation of the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), which Johnson signed into law in 1967. At
its core, CPB was to be concerned with fostering better programming and ensuring
distribution via a nationally interconnected system.70 The language of an ever-expanding
menu of channels and programming fit cable's "Blue Sky" narrative. The model was
one-way transmission from producer to consumer. Nevertheless, there were also hints
that the new technologies could be something more. Streeter documents many breathless
references to "next generation high capacity, two-way cable systems, to satellites, to
systems that combined voice, computer, and television signals all on the same wire, to the
68 Streeter, "The Cable Fable" 190.
69 Carnegie Commission on Educational Television, Public Television, a Program for Action: The Report
and Recommendations of the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television (New York: Bantam, 1967)
vii.
70 E. B. White exemplified the focus on programming quality in his letter to the Carnegie Commission,
excerpted at the beginning of the report, saying, "Noncommercial television should address itself to the
ideal of excellence, not the idea of acceptability - which is what keeps commercial television from
climbing the staircase. I think television should be the visual counterpart of the literary essay, should
arouse our dreams, satisfy our hunger for beauty, take us on journeys, enable us to participate in events,
present great drama and music, explore the sea and the sky and the woods and the hills" (p. 13).
generally 'glittering' promise of this dazzling new technology." 7 1 Johnson was clearly
swept up in this language, and at the signing of the Public Broadcasting Act, he looked
beyond the broadcast nature of the institution he was creating:
What hath man wrought? And how will man use his miracles? The
answer just begins with public broadcasting. . . . I believe the time has come to
stake another claim in the name of all the people, stake a claim based upon the
combined resources of communications. I believe the time has come to enlist the
computer and the satellite, as well as television and radio, and to enlist them in the
cause of education. . .. So I think we must consider new ways to build a great
network for knowledge-not just a broadcast system, but one that employs every
means of sending and storing information that the individual can use. . . . Yes, the
student in a small college tapping the resources of the greatest university in the
hemisphere. The country doctor getting help from a distant laboratory or a
teaching hospital; a scholar in Atlanta might draw instantly on a library in New
York; a famous teacher could reach with ideas and inspirations into some far-off
classroom, so that no child need be neglected. 72
This seemingly "wild and visionary idea" sounds remarkably close to the internet
as it manifest itself some thirty years later. It is possible that Johnson was swept up in the
"Blue Sky" rhetoric and made a remarkably prescient prediction. However, there is
another explanation as well. It is an explanation that recognizes that overblown promises
ultimately served monopolistic corporate interests, but also appreciates the nascent
7' Streeter, "The Cable Fable" 178.
72 Lyndon Johnson's comments upon signing the Public Broadcast Act of 1967
<http://www.cpb.org/aboutpb/act/remarks.html>.
development of network technologies that would ultimately allow a measure of
realization of these promises. Attached to the end of the Carnegie Commission's report
was a series of supplementary papers. One of these papers was written by MIT professor
J. C. R. Licklider, who was at the time deeply involved in developing early internet
technologies. The Commission's report explained that "Dr. Licklider's paper was
completed after the Commission had formulated its own conclusions." 73 It is perhaps not
surprising that the paper departs entirely from the focus of the Commissions report and
recommendations. Not only does it challenge the fundamental "better content, more
channels" thrust of the report, it defines itself in opposition to "broadcast" mentality:
[A] person who thinks of educational television as a set of educational
functions supported by the framework of conventional broadcast television is
unlikely to think of television as a medium for two-way communication or as
a way of transmitting the text of a book or the stimulus material for a course
of programmed instruction. The main purpose of this paper is to explore some
of the possibilities that come to mind when one deliberately looks aside from
the central line of thought about educational television and rejects the
assumption that educational applications have to be built upon the framework
of conventional broadcast television. (The term "broadcast," as I use it here, is
not intended to imply that signals are necessarily radiated into space from an
antenna. If a program were sent out to the public through coaxial cables, the
program would be "broadcast."7 4
7: Carnegie Commission 113.
74 J. C. R. Licklider, "Televistas: Looking ahead through Side Windows," in Carnegie Commission, 201-
225.
Licklider goes on to explain how interactive participation through television holds
far more educational promise than the dominant one-way model. He explains that it
would require a two-way "network" model and more sophisticated "receivers" that might
be controlled by "pointing to a part of the picture with a stylus or by pressing buttons on a
portable response unit." 7 He discusses newspapers with customized news feeds,
interactive book retrieval, and distance learning. He predicts that cable wires will
"evolve into multipurpose local networks, and that local networks will be linked together
to form regional, national, and even international networks." 76 The greatest public
interest would therefore lie in adapting the transmission-only technologies for two-way
communication.
Whether or not the president had personally read Licklider's paper, his remarks
certainly echo these ideas. Earlier that year, Johnson had commissioned a task force on
communications policy, with an emphasis on satellites.77 Nevertheless, the cable industry
would not develop anything resembling such functionality until the turn of the twenty-
first century. Indeed, they would only do so after dial-up internet had already begun to
deliver similar functionality. To be sure, early cable and satellite technology had trouble
supporting the grand visions of two-way conversation. In addition, the broadcast model
was culturally ingrained and financially lucrative. As it turned out, the language of many
channels and consumer choice would dominate "public interest" communications policy
for decades to come.
75 Licklider 208.
76 Licklider 213.
77Eugene V. Rostow, President's Task Force on Communications Policy: Final Report (Washington: GPO,
1968).
3. The Public's Interest and the Marketplace
Through the 1970's, communications policy became increasingly focused on
enabling competition and trusting market forces. This grew out of the notion that on the
broadcast side of things cable was chipping away at scarcity, and that on the common
carrier side of things new entrants were challenging the AT&T monopoly. This was
particularly true in the long-distance telephone market, where MCI and others had begun
to compete. In 1979, the FCC stated,
Primarily as a result of technological and regulatory developments, the
telecommunications industry has evolved from one dominated by a few large
entities where service was provided largely on a monopoly basis to one where
a degree of competition now exists for the provision of some communications
services. . . . Among our goals in this proceeding are to investigate and to
deregulate so far as possible consistent with the public interest in the emerging
competitive telecommunications market. 78
The Commission went out of its way to trace the regulatory roots of the public
interest standard and explain why this deference to competition complied with the
agency's mandate to ensure non-discriminatory access:
Although both the Interstate Commerce Act and the Communications Act
require rates that are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory, neither Act
purports to dictate how the reasonableness or justness of discriminations are to
be determined. Rather, the question of whether a preference, advantage or
discrimination is unreasonable or unjust has been left by Congress to the
78 77 F.C.C.2d 308.
judgment and discretion of the Commission. Board of Trade v. United States,
314 U.S. 534 (1942). In light of the similar language of the Interstate
Commerce Act and the Communications Act, our knowledge that the relevant
provisions of the Communications Act were adopted from the ICC Act, and
the absence of any contrary legislative history, we are convinced that this
agency, like the I.C.C., charged by law with assuring just and reasonable non-
discriminatory rates, has the same statutory authority to exercise judgment and
discretion as does the I.C.C.79
Congress in passing the Communications Act of 1934 could not, of course,
anticipate the variety and nature of methods of communications by wire or
radio that would come into existence in the decades to come. In such a
situation, the expert agency entrusted with administration of a dynamic
industry is entitled to latitude in coping with developments in that industry...
In a statutory scheme in which Congress has given an agency various tools
with which to protect the public interest, the agency is entitled to some leeway
in choosing which jurisdictional base and which regulatory tools will be the
most effective in advancing the Congressional objective.80
When it came to "broadcast" television (both in the traditional wireless sense and
via coaxial cable), there was some additional competition as well. By this time, satellite-
fed cable had multiplied the number of channels available to consumers. Many began to
79 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 39.
80 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 100.
argue that scarcity, which had justified content regulation in the first place, had given
way to abundance. The broadcast industry went so far as to claim that public ownership
of the airwaves had no real legal precedent. 81 The language of abundance found an
especially receptive ear with 1981-appointed FCC Chairman Mark Fowler. The
Chairman described why new technologies had made traditional broadcast regulatory
models obsolete:
Fifty-four years ago, Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927. That statute and
its successor in 1934 created the federal Communications Commission and
brought something unique into the American experience: government
licensing of a medium of creative expression. . . .But just as the technologies
we regulate have changed, so too must change the traditional relationship
between the Federal Communications Commission and broadcasters. Put
simply, I believe that we are at the end of regulating broadcasting under the
trusteeship model. Whether you call it "paternalism" or "nannyism," it is
"Big Brother," and it must cease. I believe in a marketplace approach to
broadcast regulation. .. the number of outlets in broadcasting does not justify
the trusteeship model, or its consequences. Scarcity, to my mind, is a
condition affecting all industries. Land, capital labor, and oil, are all
scarce...82
81 "Under past or present legal authority the notion that the public or the government 'owns' the airways is
without precedent": Mark S. Fowler, the National Association of Broadcasters 1979, qtd. in Rowland, I, fn
6.
82 Mark S. Fowler, "The Public's Interest," Communications & Law 4 (1982), 51-55 (transcript of address,
International Radio and Television Society, Waldorf Astoria, New York, 23 September 1981).
From Fowler's perspective, the government's unprecedented role in policing
content was a dangerous free speech violation that in any event was inferior to the
wisdom of the market. Furthermore, there was nothing special about television that
meant it should have heightened scrutiny. He claimed, "Television is just another
appliance. It's a toaster with pictures. Let the people decide through the marketplace
mechanisms what they wish to see and hear." 83 Given the relative abundance of
television channels, consumers could exercise choice and thus exert pressure for the types
of content they wished. Fowler explained in his famous 1982 co-authored article that
"the public's interest, then, defines the public interest." 84 Of course, this argument was
not new. The notion that the most commercially viable stations would best serve the
demands of the mass public is rooted in Hoover's 1920's rhetoric. It is what led Rowland
to conclude that the trusteeship model contained the "seeds of its own compromise, if not
destruction."85
1984 proved to be a big year for communication policy. The Supreme Court
determined that the Fairness Doctrine, which imposed content requirements on
broadcasters, was indeed chilling speech. The FCC would systematically dismantle the
elements of the doctrine and move further toward Fowler's "marketplace approach."
When it came to common carriers, the market-based antitrust analysis made its biggest
intervention to date. The Justice Department had settled an antitrust suit with AT&T, and
in 1984 the company was broken up into the "regional bells." The logic was based on the
notion that the divested company would allow for sufficient competition in the long-
83 Mark Fowler, interview, Reason 1 November, 1981.
84 Mark S. Fowler and David S. Brenner, "A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation," Texas Law
Review 60 (1982): 210.
85 Rowland I, at 309.
distance market, thus ensuring a degree of efficiency and consumer protection. Finally,
the Cable Act of 1984 established cable as its own regulatory silo, free of most of the
traditional public interest obligations.
New uses of wireless began to stretch the definitional capabilities of the
technology-based Communications Act. As cellular phones became widespread,
amendments recognized that they were functionally common carriers but required radio
spectrum to operate. When the FCC granted the first wave of cellular licenses, it
conducted comparative hearings (commonly known as "beauty contests") to decide
which companies should obtain them. It imposed most of the standard common carrier
obligations on their operation. As a result of court challenges and outrage from
competitors, the Commission shifted to a "lottery" based system in the 1980's in which
licenses were granted at random. This resulted in hundreds of applications from shell
companies hoping to "strike it rich" with one of the valuable licenses that they could then
effectively "sell" on the secondary market. This structure resulted in more court cases
and dissatisfaction all-around (except for the lucky few), and in 1993 Congress
authorized the use of auctions in order to allocate spectrum. 86
1993 was a milestone year for advocates of the Fowler-style "marketplace
approach" to radio regulation. Notably, Fowler had originally spoken specifically about
broadcast licenses, but Chicago-school economics were now spreading much more
broadly into FCC policy. Many traced this thinking back to economist Ronald H.
Coase's 1959 article "The Federal Communications Commission," in which he famously
advocated that the spectrum should be treated as pure property and allocated to the
86 My telling is largely based on the account found in Jonathan E. Nuechterlein and Philip J. Weiser,
Digital Crossroads : American Telecommunications Policy in the Internet Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT UP,
2005) 235-239.
highest bidder.87 Coase argued that competition would ensure that the scarce resource
would be used efficiently. When, in 1993, Congress instructed the Commission to
implement auctions, it was endorsing the notion that competitive market forces inherently
served economic efficiency and the public interest.
That same year, the Clinton administration proposed new efforts designed to
foster the "National Information Infrastructure" (NII). The "NII" had come to refer to the
sum of emerging network technologies. The Administration drafted legislation that
would create a new Title VII for the Communications Act, specifically to give the FCC
jurisdiction over the internet. It noted, "A new Title VII would provide a unified,
symmetric treatment of providers of two-way broadband services, in contrast to the
present disparate treatment of common carriers and cable operators under Titles II and VI
of the Act." 88 However, the proposal was sufficiently stalled by industry advocates wary
of new regulation that it did not pass.
Instead, in 1996, Congress undertook the most sweeping update to the
Communications Act since 1934. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 embraced the
general notion that removing regulation would lead to more competition and therefore
serve the public interest. This was especially true when it came to traditional common
carriers, and Congress sought to create conditions that would encourage more
competitors for telephone service. This involved allowing the regional Bell companies
back into the long-distance market and establishing a set of requirements requiring last-
mile carriers to sell service to long-distance carriers who wanted to get into the market.
87 Ronald H. Coase, "The Federal Communications Commission," Journal of Law and Economics 2 (Oct.
1959): 1-40.
88 Administration White Paper on Communications Act Reforms, 25 Jan. 1994. Available at:
<http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/political-science/internet-related/NII-white-paper>.
Congress went so far as to explicitly state that the Commission could "forbear" from
enforcing any Title II it wished, so long as it judged that forbearance would serve
competition. No further public interest consideration would be necessary beyond that.
ITihe Commission shall consider whether forbearance from enforcing the
provision or regulation will promote competitive market conditions, including
the extent to which such forbearance will enhance competition among
providers of telecommunications services. If the Commission determines that
such forbearance will promote competition among providers of
telecommunications services, that determination may be the basis for a
Commission finding that forbearance is in the public interest. 89
In short, the public interest had become synonymous with competition.
Another section of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, also referred to as the
Communications Decency Act (CDA), offered the first mention of the internet in a
communications statute. The CDA sought to impose certain restrictions on transmission
of "indecent" material over the internet. This was an odd but inexplicable addition of
regulation within a bill that was otherwise highly deregulatory. There was considerable
concern over the growing proliferation of pornography, and some thought that the legacy
of content regulation from broadcast should be extended to the internet. In other areas,
however, the CDA included language that emphasized a hands-off approach instead:
SEC. 230. PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE BLOCKING AND SCREENING OF
OFFENSIVE MATERIAL.
(a) FINDINGS--The Congress finds the following:
I. . . 1
8) Telecommunications Act of 1996, Title IV, Section 401, codified as 47 USC 159 (10)(b).
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished,
to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.
I. . . I
(b) POLICY- It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered
by Federal or State regulation.
Most of the CDA was ultimately struck down as unconstitutional in Reno v.
ACLU,90 although Section 230 remains in the Act. It is noteworthy that regulation of
the internet in this context refers to regulation of internet content. Regulation of
transport clearly fell under Title II (to the extent that the internet service in question
was delivered via common carriers and to the extent that the Commission did not
choose to use its new "forbearance" authority to withhold regulation).
Following the 1996 Act, the Bell companies re-entered the long distance
market and several new "Competitive Local Exchange Carriers" (CLECS) tried to
make a run at the local market. They did so by relying on the FCC's new
"unbundling" rules, which required the local former Bells to sell access to its lines at
a pre-determined rate. By 2002, many of the CLECs had gone bankrupt or lost
regulatory battles to maintain the unbundled access that was their lifeblood. 91' The
90 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
91 Larry F. Darby, Jeffrey A. Eisenach, and Joseph S. Kraemer, "The CLEC Experiment: Anatomy of a
market failed to produce competition precisely in those places where single firms
retained control over facilities that were essential to competition. In the following
years many more CLECs would go out of business or be acquired by the incumbents
in a string of telecommunications consolidations. 92  It became clear that the
Commission's experiment with local telecommunications competition was not
working.
Nevertheless, this reality did not blunt the force of the competition rhetoric,
and the Commission considered its role to deregulate and to defer to "the market"
wherever possible. As a new FCC commissioner in 1998, Michael K. Powell stated,
The night after I was sworn in, I waited for a visit from the angel of the public
interest. I waited all night, but she did not come. And, in fact, five months into
this job, I still have had no divine awakening and no one has issued me my
public interest crystal ball. But I am here, an enlightened wiseman without a
clue. The best that I can discern is that the public interest standard is a bit like
modern art, people see in it what they want to see. That may be a fine quality
for art, but it is a bit of a problem when that quality exists in a legal standard. 93
Four years later, Powell had become somewhat more enlightened and articulated a
distinctly market-oriented approach: "Indeed, if the Commission is to do its job, the
public interest must reflect the realities of the marketplace and current spectrum use.
Meltdown," Progress on Point 23 September 2002 <http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/pops/pop9.23clecexperiment.pdf>.
92' The largest and most dramatic of these acquisitions was when Verizon acquired MCI in 2006.
9- Michael K. Powell, "The Public Interest Standard: A New Regulator's Search for Enlightenment,"
American Bar Association 17th Annual Legal Forum on Communications Law, Las Vegas, Nevada, 5
April 1998.
Today, I would suggest that full and complete consumer choice of wireless devices
and services is the very meaning of the public interest." 94
The competition-only view of the public interest had permeated American policy
discourse almost completely. This had happened in the same period during which
broadband internet access was becoming a way of life for many Americans. Like cable
and cellular phones, the broadband internet access posed a regulatory quandary. How
should the Commission view broadband service that was delivered over non-common-
carriers? If cable-based internet and DSL-based internet provided the same service, did it
make sense to regulate them entirely differently? 95 The general deregulatory tone
encouraged the Commission to find ways to lift the common carrier regulations on
broadband altogether. Congress had given the Commission the "forbearance" option, but
in 2002 the Commission chose a more radical path. It issued the Cable Broadband
Order 96 which used the creative new strategy of defining cable internet as a "Title I"
service. Title I is essentially the introduction to the Communications Act and contains no
specific regulations at all. This decision meant that cable modems were free of regulation
by default but subject to any specific new rules defined by the Commission. Several
years of litigation ensued, and in 2005 the Supreme Court settled the matter in favor of
the FCC's decision. 97 The FCC immediately declared that DSL was also an unregulated
94 Michael K. Powell, "Broadband Migration Ill: New Directions in Wireless Policy," Silicon Flatirons
Telecommunications Program, University of Colorado, Boulder. 30 Oct. 2002
<http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2002/spmkp212.html>.
95 Eli Noam was especially prescient on this matter, noting in 1994 that sustaining the common carrier
status in an era of competitors that were not common carriers would undermine the doctrine altogether
("Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending Doom of Common Carriage," Telecommunications Policy 18
[1994]: 435-452).
96 "Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory
Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking," 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002).
97 National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 2005.
Title I service, 98 which was subsequently followed by similar declarations for wireless
broadband 99 and even barely used technologies such as Broadband over Power Line. 0oo
This set of decisions effectively classified all broadband as a vaguely regulated
Title I service, despite the clear legacy of common-carrier regulated internet service in
the dial-up era.' 0' The decisions mark a significant step in the transformation of the
public interest standard in communications law from being rooted in non-discriminatory
safeguards to market-trusting responses.' 0 2 To be sure, there was a great deal of counter-
productive, inefficient, and special-interest language that had built up in the existing
regulatory structure. Common carriage as it existed by the turn of the twenty-first
century was a beast often divorced from reality. With the emergence of a new medium,
the Commission chose to sidestep these concerns altogether. Still, when the Commission
defined its way out of the Title II conundrum, it did not reflect a core change in the nature
of public interest. It was a regulatory maneuver designed to avoid pitfalls in a broken
regulatory system. The Commission then placed its hopes in the adjudication of "bad
actors" that violated antitrust law or more general competition concerns. However,
although antitrust might well be just as outdated, it is itself subject to broad interpretation,
The court deferred to the FCC's judgment generally, and at that time the FCC had decided that cable
broadband was a "Title I" service.
98 "Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities," Report and
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 14, 853 (2005).
99 "Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireless Networks,"
Declaratory Ruling, 22 FCC, rcd. 5901 (2007).
100 "FCC Classifies Broadband Over Power Line-Enabled Internet Access as 'Information Service,"' press
release (3 Nov. 2006) <http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-26833 1Al .pdf>.
o10 James B. Speta, "FCC Authority to Regulate the Internet: Creating It and Limiting It," Loyola
University Chicago Law Journal 35 (2004): 15-39 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=490122>. Speta also notes
how this decision created a substantially muddied enforcement environment.
102 Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W. Merrill, "The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law,"
Columbia Law Review 98.6 (Oct. 1998): 1323-1409.
and some of its most relevant doctrine is in a confused state.'0 Will a competition-only
approach remain faithful to the demands of the ever-elusive public interest standard?
C. THE INTERNET ETHOS
As communications policy was being reworked as competition policy during the
second half of the twentieth century, engineers and scientists were imagining the next
generation of computing technologies. They envisioned individuals who were
empowered by easy-to-use storage and networking devices. These devices moved from
theory to proof-of-concept and eventually to mass adoption, carrying with them the
sensibilities of their designers. The ethos behind these personal computers and open
networks differed greatly from the privately controlled media of the day. It began with
the ability to store and retrieve local documents, then included connection of all
documents in a vast library of knowledge, and ultimately encompassed a general purpose
infrastructure that supported a broad range of whatever its users might envision.
1. Libraries of the Future
Theoretical computing devices were initially framed in terms of familiar
metaphors, such as the library. Various thinkers asked how we might we organize,
reference, and share all of this knowledge in such a way that we can make the best use of
it as a society. Dr. Vannevar Bush was a prominent scientist during World War II,
supervising thousands of other scientists working on the war effort. With the end of the
'
0oRobert A. Skitol, "Three Years after Verizon v. Trinko: Broad Dissatisfaction with the Whole Thrust of
Refusal to Deal Law," The Antitrust Source 6.2 (April 2007) http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-
source/07/04/Apr07-Skitol4=27f.odf.
war in 1945, he turned his attention to what he thought would be the next great societal
need. His article, "As We May Think," strikes a collective chord as he lays out the core
problem and a theoretical device:
A record, if it is to be useful to science, must be continuously extended, it
must be stored, and above all it must be consulted. Today we make the record
conventionally by writing and photography, followed by printing; but we also
record on film, on wax disks, and on magnetic wires. Even if utterly new
recording procedures do not appear, these present ones are certainly in the process
of modification and extension. [... ]
Consider a future device for individual use, which is a sort of mechanized
private file and library. It needs a name, and, to coin one at random, "memex" will
do. A memex is a device in which an individual stores all his books, records, and
communications, and which is mechanized so that it may be consulted with
exceeding speed and flexibility. It is an enlarged intimate supplement to his
memory.
It consists of a desk, and while it can presumably be operated from a
distance, it is primarily the piece of furniture at which he works. On the top are
slanting translucent screens, on which material can be projected for convenient
reading. There is a keyboard, and sets of buttons and levers. Otherwise it looks
like an ordinary desk. 104
Bush's "memex" was technologically impossible in its day, but it laid out both a
technical approach and a normative motivation. Nearly twenty years later, researchers in
10 4Vannevar Bush, "As We May Think," The Atlantic Monthly July 1945: 101-108.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, would come to a similar set of conclusions. Under a grant
from the Council on Library Resources, engineers and psychologists at the firm Bolt
Beranek and Newman explored concepts and problems of libraries of the future. They
chose to envision what might be possible by the year 2000. The researchers published
their findings in a 1965 book, Libraries of the Future, and psychologist/engineer J. C. R.
Licklider wrote in the introduction,
Very great and pertinent advances doubtless can be made during the
remainder of this century, both in information technology and in the ways
man uses it. Whether very great and pertinent advances will be made,
however, depends strongly on how societies and nations set their goals.
Moreover, the "system" of man's development and use of knowledge is
regenerative. If a strong effort is made to improve that system, then the early
results will facilitate subsequent phases of the effort, and so on, progressively,
in an exponential crescendo. On the other hand, if intellectual processes and
their technological bases are neglected, then goals that could have been
achieved will remain remote, and proponents of their achievement will find it
difficult to disprove charges of irresponsibility and autism.'0 5
This is the same Licklider that would, two years later, urge the Carnegie Commission
to shift its focus from broadcast-based thinking to the interactive possibilities of new
communications infrastructure. He would emphasize the two-way nature of learning,
and the remarkable possibilities of networked technology.
105 J. C. R. Licklider, Council on Library Resources, et al., Libraries of the Future (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1965).
The critical difference between this early-sixties work and that of Vannevar Bush
was that new storage and networking technologies could enable the kind of knowledge
archiving, and especially sharing, that was pure fancy just twenty years before. Libraries
of the Future lays out the state of experimentation at the moment in which the normative
conviction to organize and share vast bodies of knowledge globally met the technological
possibility to do so. 10 6 By the time the book was published, Licklider had already left
Bolt Beranek and Newman in order to run a division of the Department of Defense's new
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). In his role, he would decide which
computing projects to fund nationwide. Hard drive technology was making storage faster
and more practical, early graphical interfaces were making computing more user-friendly,
and networking was making it possible to connect to distant computers.
In an era when most engineers could only envision computers as room-sized
contraptions used for data processing, Licklider was remarkably prescient. Rather than
focus on networking only as a means to "resource sharing" the processor, he saw the
potential for computers to become valuable communication devices. In the opening of a
co-authored 1968 paper, he remarked, "In a few years, men will be able to communicate
more effectively through a machine than face to face."' 0 7 Networking was key, and
Licklider used his funding power at ARPA - and later his sway over his successors - to
106 Indeed, in his paper for the Carnegie Commission, "Televistas," he would note, "The economic
disadvantages of duplicating, distributing, and storing books that may never be read is obvious. Some of
the techniques of what is currently known as the 'non-Gutenberg technology' make it possible to avoid
most of that disadvantage" (p. 217).
107 J. C. R. Licklider and Robert W. Taylor, "The Computer as Communication Device," Science and
Technology 76 (April 1968): 21-31.
persuade engineers from across the country to cooperate on a standard, open system for
interconnecting. 08 This would become the internet as we know it today.
When, in 1967, Licklider wrote that "local networks will be linked together to
form regional, national, and even international networks," he was well aware that these
advances were more than simply a larger library or higher quality educational
television. 109 Indeed, the library of the future was not just a library. This type of
"television" was nothing like the one-way transmission of the past. Instead, the internet
would become a robust multipurpose network for knowledge, applications, and - most
importantly - humans.
2. Avoiding Scarcity of Uses
The internet ethos was not originally articulated in the language of
communications law. Instead, the early engineers described their goals in terms of ideas
like robustness and flexibility. The internet evolved in an odd backwater, with
government funding of little-known academic experiments. The community of
researchers came from many different institutions where they were already pursuing a
variety of projects. J.C.R. Licklider's vision when he funded these different groups was
that they establish a common network platform to support the interoperation of the
diverse systems and projects. Thus, at the core of the effort was the assumption that
particular uses should not be prescribed. In retrospect, this transforms the dominant
justification for broadcast law of the day - that scarcity requires government control of
108 Mitchell. M. Waldrop, The Dream Machine: J. C. R. Licklider and the Revolution That Made
Computing Personal (New York: Viking, 2001).
109 Licklider, "Televistas" 213.
content. Instead, the internet mentality eschewed centralized control of transmissions by
building decentralized user control into the protocols.
Jon Postel was a graduate student at UCLA when the first networking
experiments were being conducted. He was part of the younger generation of computer
scientists that met and exchanged ideas through ARPA funding for student conferences.
Ideas turned into a digital network called the ARPANET, which eventually became the
internet we know today. When defining "TCP," one of the fundamental internet
protocols, Postel famously articulated what is now called the "robustness principle." The
principle also describes the social ethos among the early internet community: "be
conservative in what you do, be liberal in what you accept from others."' 10 From a
technical perspective, it means that routing entities on the network must pass along traffic
from any source, as long as the structure of the message conforms to a minimally
restrictive standard. This creates, from the bottom up, a store-and-forward system of
packet-based communication. This system is open to all comers and allows innovation
on top of the basic protocol.
This approach would be the foundation for the myriad uses of the internet to
come. There were few technical or administrative hurdles to new innovators. There was
no formal body that must approve a particular new way of using the network. All
standards were set through "Requests For Comments" (RFCs), which were simply text
files in which the authors explained their new approach. Well-defined RFCs with useful
standards would be adopted, while impractical RFCs were not be widely implemented.
Various internet engineers continued to meet informally to discuss the latest
110 Jon Postel, "Transmission Control Protocol," Internet Request for Comments RFC 793, ISI (Sept. 1981).
developments, and in 1986 they formed the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in
order to evaluate RFCs. Even this semi-formalization of the standards-making process
was remarkably open, and the IETF states that "any interested person can participate in
the work, know what is being decided, and make his or her voice heard on the issue."' I
As the internet began to enter the public eye in the 1990's, many described it as
multiplying the effects of broadcast-like abundance. In 1997, Wired Magazine
proclaimed the immanent blossoming of "push" technology, in which web browsers
would die off in favor of broadcast-like transmissions from expert companies. 112 Long-
time communications economist Bruce M. Owen wrote an entire book called The Internet
Challenge to Television in which he explained why the internet was not like television,
and predicted that "In its present form, it seems extremely unlikely that the Internet will
ever reach most households, much less become a mass medium like television ...
Meanwhile, television will continue to be delivered by means other than the Internet." 13
Implicit in both of these analyses is the notion that the internet is or should primarily be
concerned with broadcast, or that its way of interacting with the legacy medium involves
adding abundance of channels for relatively passive consumers. Indeed, Owen assumes
that one can determine "appropriate" uses of the network and that things like IP
Telephony are objectively inappropriate on economic grounds. 114 This flies in the face of
fundamental assumptions of the internet developer community - assumptions that
ultimately propelled the medium to precisely the success it enjoys today.
IETF, Internet RFC 3935.
S112 Wired Magazine, 5.03 (March 1997) <http://www.wired 
.com/wired/archive/5.03/ff push.html>.
13 Bruce M. Owen, The Internet Challenge to Television (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999) 233.
114 Owen 223.
The early engineers appreciated abundance, but an abundance of a different
nature. Whereas the "Blue Sky" cable rhetoric and the advance of high speed
telecommunications fostered hype of unlimited volume of transmission, internet
engineers built into the network the capacity for unlimited types of interaction. These
early engineers understood the- scarcity of bandwidth all too well. They had worked with
these limitations as they connected the very first links of the internet over specially leased
AT&T phone lines. What would lead to long-term innovation was the decision to leave
the power to invent or use new technologies on top of the network in the hands of the
users.
Owen complained that "the whining of early Internet users, for whom everything
was 'free' because someone else paid, has become tiresome."11 5 The problem with this
critique is that it misunderstands the type of freedom that many had come to value. To be
sure, internet users were paying for their usage in various ways - dial-up fees, advertising
attention, online purchases, etc. However, the real freedom came in the form of freedom
from intermediaries who leveraged control over the types of usage. This is the same type
of distinction that Free Software advocates describe when they say "free as in speech, not
as in beer." 16
However, this new kind of abundance of use can threaten the old order in which
scarcity is used as a tool to protect legacy business models. Robin Mansell has explained
how scarcity and abundance make up two opposite poles in a dialectic of market forces
on the internet. 117 While early commentators declared the end of scarcity in the age of
") Owen 226.
1" <http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.htm 1>.
117 Robin Mansell, "New Media Competition and Access: The Scarcity-Abundance Dialectic," New Media
Society 1.2 (1999): 155-182.
ubiquitous internet access, Mansell reminds us that intermediaries have a strong incentive
to create artificial scarcity to protect their old ways of doing business. They may think
that they know what users want, or they may decide that a particular set of uses will be
more profitable and use their privileged positions to dictate outcomes. There is no
inherent reason, she explains, that these new technologies will be able to overcome those
tendencies. While technical infrastructure can predispose the internet to abundance of
use, norms, laws, and especially markets can introduce self-interested scarcity.
Early internet activists realized that the law could be used toward the ends of
limiting the "free as in speech" part of online abundance. As Congress debated new
interventions into broadcast-like content regulation, John Perry Barlow delivered his
now-famous "A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace," which opens this way:
"Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from
Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave
us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather."' 18
Barlow's vision is hands-off, assuming that government regulation can only do harm to
the freedoms being enjoyed online. Around the same time, Jerry Berman and Daniel
Weitzner explained how one-way channel scarcity threatens free speech whereas
decentralized open-access networks more fully embrace the First Amendment.
Some entity, generally the network owner and operator, must decide which of
the large number of potential programs will be given access to the smaller
number of channels available. This gatekeeper role is also required because
the network architecture of both cable and broadcast media demands that all
programming be collected at a central point for redistribution.
18John Perry Barlow <http://homes.eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-Final.html>.
The decentralized, open-access model presents a sharp contrast to the
centralized, one-way channel model that typifies most mass media today.
Properly implemented, the open-access model holds the promise of
overcoming the diversity problems created by the centralized channel model.
The open-access model would permit a level of diversity only possible today
in the print medium. Moreover, this model's potential to lower publishing
costs and increase connectivity promises a diversity of sources undreamed of
in the era of print. The functional architecture of the open-access network
model has two important features: (I) capacity for an unlimited number of
information sources, and (2) decentralized access without the need for
gatekeepers. An open-access network can accommodate a virtually unlimited
number of information providers as well as information users. This is the case
because the architecture of the network makes no distinction between users
who are information providers and those who are information users. In fact,
most users play both roles from time to time. All who obtain access have the
option of making information available to all other users on the network; thus,
the sources of information available are limited only by the number of users
who seek access. Cable television or satellite networks, in contrast, are
designed to add users relatively easily, but those users have no ability to send
information to others on the network." 9
119 Jerry Berman and Daniel J. Weitzner, "Abundance and User Control: Renewing the Democratic Heart
of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media," The Yale Law Journal 104.7 (May 1995): 1619-
1637.
There are two ways to read these early internet freedom-fighters. One interpretation is
that the internet should be free of any government interventions whatsoever. 120 In the
Reno v. A CL U case, which overturned the content regulations that Barlow so strongly
opposed, the Court noted that
IUlnlike the conditions that prevailed when Congress first authorized
regulation of the broadcast spectrum, the Internet can hardly be considered a
"scarce" expressive commodity. It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost
capacity for communication of all kinds. . . . This dynamic, multifaceted
category of communication includes not only traditional print and news
services, but also audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive, real-
time dialogue line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther
than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail
exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer...
.[Our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment
scrutiny that should be applied to this medium. 12 1
The court was correct in noting that the internet enables a great deal more
diversity than its mass-media predecessors. Nevertheless, it emerged in the context of a
transport infrastructure has been regulated for a long time. Categorical regulatory
forbearance of anything related to the internet is unwise in the context of market forces
that motivate non-governmental intermediaries to generate artificial scarcity. If, based
purely on the desire to refrain from speech-hampering regulation of the government, we
120 Steve Mitra, "The Death of Media Regulation in the Age of the Internet," N. Y. U. Journal of Legislation
and Public Policy 4.2 (2001): 415-438.
121 Reno v. ACLU.
are too timid to regulate speech-hampering conduct of carriers, we have worked against
our own purposes. I do not think that this is what these thinkers meant to do. It is more
appropriate to read the early internet advocates and the court as drawing a distinction
between content regulation and infrastructure regulation. Indeed, governmental
safeguards at the infrastructure layer can protect market-motivated discrimination at the
content layer. Such an approach is compatible with the non-discriminatory principles in
communication law, which have been manifest in technology-specific doctrines like
common carriage and interconnection obligations.
This "layered" approach to internet regulation resonates strongly with the
technical structure of the internet itself. At its core, the Internet Protocol (IP) defines a
set of basic standards that are augmented by adding additional layers. IP is referred to as
the "transport" layer, and other standards add functionality by building on top of this
layer. Sending email, browsing the web, and streaming multimedia all involve specific
implementations of content or application layer protocols. Individuals may choose how
to use the core IP infrastructure available to them because these additional layers are all
modular. This creates what has been called the "virtuous hourglass" of the internet, in
which most of the technical intelligence resides in the hands of end-users and not at the
core of the network. 122 When applied to regulatory structures, it entails a more function-
based "horizontal" classification system compared to the technology based "vertical"
silos of the Communications Act. 12 3
1:2 Jonathan L. Zittrain, "The Generative Internet," Harvard Law Review, 119: 1974, (2006)
<http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/119/mav06/zittrain.pdf>.
123 Richard Whitt and Stephen J. Schultze, " Emergence Economics," Journal on Telecommunications and
High Technology Law 7.2 pending.
The promise of future robustness, technological innovation, and free speech
online rests with this more nuanced understanding of the role of regulation. By
translating time-tested non-discriminatory principles for infrastructure, regulators can
square the ethos and technology of the internet with the legacy of communications law.
Avoiding scarcity of uses means some limited intervention, but only at the transport
layer. Scarcity of capacity will continue to be a challenge for the foreseeable future, but
when citizens can choose how to use that limited capacity they will nevertheless enjoy an
abundance that was impossible in the era of one-way media.
3. Encouraging Abundance of Peers
In many-to-many systems, there is a curious phenomenon that does not emerge in
other environments. Each new user added to the network adds incremental value for all
other users of the network. In the phone system, this meant that when more people
subscribed to service, it became more valuable for those who might wish to call them (or
be called). Likewise, fax machines became more useful as they became more
widespread. On the internet, the more people, content, and applications that are
accessible, the more useful it is overall. Economists call this a "network effect" and
discuss the critical points at which particular networks experience rapid growth.124 When
proprietary standards generate network effects, the benefits accrue to whomever controls
that proprietary standard. When open standards experience the same effects, all parties
benefit. Whereas the "robustness principle" argues that the internet is for every use,
network effects demonstrate that the internet is for everyone. This principle is so central
124Nicholas Economides, "Public Policy in Network Industries," NYU Law and Economics Research Paper
no. 06-49 (Sept. 2006) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=936469>.
to the ethos and well-functioning of the network that early internet engineer Vint Cerf
wrote an RFC entitled, "The Internet is For Everyone."' 2 5 In the summer of 2008, several
groups advocating for internet access, choice, openness, and innovation launched the
"Internet for Everyone" campaign.126
However, not everyone has the same access to the internet. Most Americans have
some form of access, but in many cases this is via a local library or a school. Even dial-
up internet is a radically different experience from always-on broadband. The ability to
send and receive at high speeds, from home, can determine whether one is fully able to
participate in the network. Henry Jenkins calls this the "participation gap," and he
emphasizes how this stunts digital learning, civic engagement, and cultural flourishing.127
It also has serious effects on the overall economy and the ability for individual businesses
to connect with customers. The network effects of the internet are potentially even more
powerful than the network effects of one-to-one media like the telephone. Many people,
acting according to many motivations-business, hobby, advocacy-multiply the value
for everyone involved. This can often happen asynchronously. For example a web page
or forum post that I create today may be used to someone else's benefit a year from now.
On the internet, much of the value created is what economists call a "spillover" - an
unintended positive benefit for others. 12 8
125 Vint Cerf, "The Internet is for Everyone," Internet RFC 3271
<hbttp ://www.apps.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3271 .txt>.
126 <http://www.internetforeveryone.org/>.
127 Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide (New York: New York UP,
2006).
28 Brett M. Frischmann, Mark A. Lemley, "Spillovers," John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
Stanford Law School, Working Paper No. 321 (April 2006). Available at:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=898881 >.
But why might we envision some kind of government intervention in the context
of this principle of universal connectivity? To begin with, the internet is fast becoming a
core utility, much like water, electricity, roads, or telephones. 129 This transforms it from
a "nice to have" thing to a "must have." Historically, the government has had an active
role in supporting these types resources, for the good of all citizens. More day-to-day
tasks require the internet. This also places broadband more clearly in the class of other
businesses traditionally considered to be infrastructure and traditionally subject to public
interest obligations.
The network effects of the internet also argue for some form of government
intervention. To begin with, the overall economic growth can be so strongly affected by
these factors that intervention becomes a matter of international competitiveness. 30
Independent economic actors, especially the telecommunications carriers, are not
necessarily motivated to connect everybody. They are motivated to connect those in the
least expensive (typically the most dense) areas, or those from whom they can extract the
most profits. This does not necessarily align with access for all. Thus, the national or
global benefits of a universal network would not be realized without some incentives or
requirements. The internet is a network of networks, and the potential network effects
multiply as more users connect and invent new types of uses.
The related but distinct "essential facilities doctrine" comes from antitrust law. It
dates back to the 1912 United States v. Terminal Railroad Association case in which the
court decided that the owner of the only bridge across the Mississippi must grant
129 Kevin Werbach, "Connections: Beyond Universal Service in the Digital Age," Journal on
Telecommunications and High Technology Law (2008), pending.
130 Susan P. Crawford, "The Internet and the Project of Communications Law," 11 Feb. 2007
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=962594>.
nondiscriminatory access to all competitors. The reasoning was that shared usage of the
bridge was the only way to preserve competition. The doctrine would be developed
further in other contexts but would always deal with competitive effects between
businesses. In 2004, the Supreme Court heard Verizon v. Trinko, which asked whether or
not telecommunications carriers could be liable under the Sherman Antitrust Act for not
adequately opening its network.13' The Supreme Court delivered a substantial, if not
completely damning, critique of the essential facilities doctrine as a whole. It also
explained that communication technologies might be outside the scope of antitrust law if
the FCC was already regulating the industry. Altogether, there is a great deal of
speculation about how antitrust and essential facilities might affect communications law
going forward. 132 Perhaps elements could be salvaged in the service of traditional public
interest principles. Spencer Waller and Brett Frischmann explicitly seek to imbue the
antitrust-based essential facilities doctrine with the traditional public interest
considerations of public infrastructure.' 33 I question whether this is approach is likely to
succeed, although I applaud the authors' intent. On my reading, the doctrine was never
central to public interest communications regulation, and it may not bear the weight of
such obligations. The internet has become "essential" in the sense that it is a core part of
citizenship, commerce, and culture - but arguing that the internet is for everybody need
not rely on a narrowly conceived and legally battered doctrine.' 34
131 Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 2004.
132 Philip J. Weiser, "The Relationship of Antitrust and Regulation in a Deregulatory Era," University of
Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper no. 06-19, Antitrust Bulletin 50 (2005): 549.
13 3Spencer Weber Waller and Brett M. Frischmann, "Revitalizing Essential Facilities," Antitrust Law
Journal 75.1 (2008) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=961609>.
134 Barbara Cherry attempts to document the various contexts in which services have been considered
"essential" in some sense of the word, and lays out a framework for assessing which particular doctrines
The internet transforms the traditional dialectic of scarcity versus. abundance. By
resisting scarcity of uses, it places choice in the hands of consumers. This avoids some of
the First Amendment pitfalls of broadcast media and catalyzes innovation unlike the early
telephone era. By encouraging an abundance of users, it welcomes everyone on an even
footing. This extends the benefits of the network and amplifies the remarkable network
effects. These norms are congruent with a long history of non-discriminatory access and
universal service, but they transform some of the outmoded policies of recent history.
The principles alone do not solve difficult questions such as "Who pays for it?" They do,
however, shape the tools and means that policymakers might employ when trying to
answer those difficult questions.
II. CONTEMPORARY REGULATORY DEBATES
Fundamental public interest principles are at the heart of a series of current federal
regulatory debates. "'The public interest" appears frequently in contemporary
communications law and FCC rulemakings, but the force of the phrase has been diluted.
In this section, I provide a brief survey of three leading battlegrounds and place them in
the context of longstanding public interest principles.
A. NETWORK DISCRIMINATION
apply in each context ("Utilizing 'Essentiality of Access' Analyses to Mitigate Risky, Costly and Untimely
Government Interventions in Converging Telecommunications Technologies and Markets," CommLaw
Conspectus 11.2 [2003]: 251-275). 1 am sympathetic to this approach, although starting with the
"essential" terminology may prove too confusing when trying to deal with various doctrines with diverse
sources and evolutions. Perhaps simply referring to "public utilities" or "common carriers" or even
appealing to broader "public interest" goals can avoid allowing the debate to be drawn too far into the
realm of pure antitrust.
Many recent flashpoints in communications law have centered on whether and
how carriers may discriminate between communications they carry. On one end of the
spectrum, the government would mandate that carriers openly share or provide access to
competing providers, charging the government-determined marginal cost. This is the
approach taken by many European countries. On the other extreme, carriers would be
permitted to treat their lines as pure private property - charging, degrading, or blocking
whomever they wish. In the BrandX decision and the subsequent FCC rulings, the
United States has largely taken a private property approach. 135
The first round of internet-era debate over network discrimination took place over
so-called "open access" rules which would require American carriers to share their
physical infrastructure-all the way down to consumer household connections-with
their competitors. This argument relied in part on the assumption that robust competition
in that market would be unlikely in the short term, because there were few technologies
that could reach all the way to the home. It also relied in part on the argument that as
infrastructure, it should inherently be open to all-comers. In any event, the BrandX
decision ended this debate. Carriers would not be required to share their broadband
infrastructure with competitors. After winning this decision, the FCC released a non-
binding policy statement, which has come to be referred to as the "Four Freedoms"
statement. It states, in part,
* . . . consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their
choice.
135 Although BrandX itself acknowledged that there are ongoing proceedings that address limitations on
carrier conduct, the general thrust of the decision defers to the FCC's judgment that carriers should be free
to do as they wish.
* . . .consumers are entitled to run applications and use services of their
choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement.
* . . .consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do
not harm the network.
S. . . consumers are entitled to competition among network providers,
application and service providers, and content providers.' 36
At first glance, this sounds like a strong endorsement of the general right of users
to access and use the network. 137 However, the Commission included a substantial pair
of caveats in a footnote at the end of the statement, which read, ". .. we are not adopting
rules in this policy statement. The principles we adopt are subject to reasonable network
management." ' 38 The allowance for "reasonable network management," and the fact that
the policy statement did not bear the force of a formal rulemaking, opened a second
round of debate in the broadband non-discrimination battle. This time the question was
whether the carriers, which had won the right to exclude other internet providers from
their networks, could extend this practice to discriminate between the various content
types and sources traveling over their exclusive lines. Some internet content providers
would benefit from higher-priority transport, and the carriers reasoned that they could
extract more profits from these companies while also solving their persistent network
136 FCC 05-151, "Policy Statement," 20 FCC, Red 14986 (2005) 3.
1"7 It is important to note that these four principles, even without the caveats, do not clearly grant the right
to non-discriminatory access. Commissioner Michael J. Copps echoed the call of several neutrality
advocates in his comments on the Comcast Order, saying that the Commission should adopt a "fifth
principle of non-discrimination" (1 Aug. 2008 <http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-
08-183A3.pdf>).
38 FCC 05-151, n. 15.
congestion problems. Critics replied that such practices would violate fundamental
principles of communications law and the spirit of the internet. The issue had become
known as "network neutrality."l 39 Critics were awakened when former SBC CEO Ed
Whitacre famously commented,
Now what they [content providers I would like to do is use my pipes free, but I
ain't going to let them do that because we have spent this capital and we have
to have a return on it. So there's going to have to be some mechanism for these
people who use these pipes to pay for the portion they're using. Why should
they be allowed to use my pipes? The Internet can't be free in that sense,
because we and the cable companies have made an investment and for a
Google or Yahoo! or Vonage or anybody to expect to use these pipes [for]
free is nuts!' 40
A coalition organized by the non-profit group Free Press, fired back:
The Savethelnternet.com Coalition launches April 24 to urge Congress to take
immediate steps to save the First Amendment of the Internet - a principle
called "network neutrality" that ensures that the Web remains open to
innovation and progress. Congress is about to vote on a bill that would ruin
network neutrality by letting big phone and cable companies set up toll booths
along the information superhighway. Companies like AT&T, Verizon and
139 Wu, "Network Neutrality" 141-179.
140 Ed Whitacre, qtd. in "At SBC, It's All About 'Scale and Scope,'" Business Week, 7 Nov. 2005
<http://www.businessweek.com/@n34h*IUQu7KtOwgA/magazine/content/05_45/b3958092.htm>.
Comcast are spending tens of millions in Washington to kill any protection of
the free and open Internet.141
Ed Whitacre's comments and the Save the Internet Coalition staked out two poles
in the debate. Because broadband had become regulated as a vague "Title I" carrier, and
because the FCC's policy statement did not bear the force of a formal rulemaking, there
was a great deal of room for debate. Network neutrality differed from traditional
common carriage in an important way. In the past, carriers did not have the practical
capability to examine the contents of what they were transporting and to then
discriminate accordingly. Railroad operators could not open every piece of cargo to
determine whether or not they might be able to extract more income from the sender or
manufacturer. Circuit-switched telephone operators devoted an entire circuit to the
caller, without the ability to throttle bandwidth or charges based on content. 142 This all
changed in the era of broadband, in which all packets became aggregated together and
technology for the first time permitted fine-grained discrimination. The question now is
whether or not carriers should be legally prevented from exercising this discretion, which
in the past was prevented as a practical matter. The issue has been largely framed in
terms of free speech principles, economic arguments, and the internet ethos.
1. Free Speech
Those arguing in favor of a non-discrimination rule often emphasize that open
democratic discourse relies on equal freedom to speak. If large companies are permitted
141 Free Press <http://www.savetheinternet.com/blog/2006/04/1 9/act-now-to-save-the-internet/>.
142 Furthermore, they were legally prevented from differential charges based on the phone numbers called
according to the FCC's Computer II rules.
to choose who can communicate in what fashion, they claim, this freedom would be at
risk. In a post-BrandX environment, where the carriers maintained exclusive control
over their near-monopoly networks, these critics have grown concerned that these large
companies would forfeit free speech in favor of more profit. For example, Barry
Steinhardt of the ACLU's Technology and Liberty Program stated in June of 2008 that,
as opposed to their early victory against Congressional censorship in Reno v. ACLU, "No
longer is the government the greatest threat to free speech online. The threat is now the
companies that run the pipes." 143 Some of these arguments resemble traditional
criticisms of broadcast media: consolidation has put too much power into the hands of
relatively few. On the other hand, the non-discriminatory internet functions very
differently from broadcast media. Anyone can speak without a license, and
communication is inherently two-way. Whereas in the broadcast era the free speech
arguments took place at the level of content, internet non-discrimination most often takes
place at the transport layer.
There is also a free speech argument against non-discriminatory rules.144 The
carriers consider any government intervention to be a threat to their right to speak. Why,
they argue, should the state be dictating what they can and cannot do on their own
networks? To be sure, there is a strong precedent for non-intervention in print media.
There has never been a requirement on newspapers to publish anything that somebody
wanted published, and especially not that they charge the same rates to everyone.
143 Barry Steinhardt, qtd. in <http://www.openmarket.org/2008/06/10/net-neutrality-a-civil-liberty/>.
'~14 See, for example, Randolph May of the Free State Foundation's comments in "Broadcasting & Cable,"
9 Aug. 2008
<http://www.broadcastingcable.com/index.asp?lavout=talkbackCommentsFull&talk back header id=6372
794&articleid=CA6372794.>.
Furthermore, by now broadcast regulation has repeatedly surrendered ground on first
amendment challenges. 45 In an era of competition, they argue, even the weak force of
scarcity-based doctrine cannot overcome their first amendment rights. 4 6
2. Economic Arguments
As the network neutrality debate has evolved, economic analysis has also come to
the fore. Opponents of neutrality rules emphasize the competition focus of the 1996 Act
and its emphasis on market forces in order to foster growth and deployment of new
communications technologies. Instead of a crippling network neutrality mandate, argues
Christopher Yoo, the government should remain hands-off and encourage "network
diversity." ' 4 7 According to him, "The central focus of broadband policy should be on
how best to foster competition in the last mile."l 48 The theory is that when carriers are
allowed to experiment with business plans (and network discrimination), the market will
145 Jonathan Weinberg, "Broadcasting and Speech," California Law Review 81 (1993): 1103-1206.
146 Commissioner Robert M. McDowell brazenly made this argument on August 12, 2008. Absurdly
conflating broadcast notions of public interest and network notions of non-discrimination, he said, "I think
the fear is that somehow large corporations will censor their content, their points of view, right. I think the
bigger concern for them should be if you have government dictating content policy, which by the way
would have a big First Amendment problem. Then, whoever is in charge of government is going to
determine what is fair, under a so-called 'Fairness Doctrine,' which won't be called that - it'll be called
something else .... So, will Web sites, will bloggers have to give equal time or equal space on their Web
site to opposing views rather than letting the marketplace of ideas determine that? (Jeff Poor, "FCC
Commissioner: Return of Fairness Doctrine Could Control Web Content," Business & Media Institute, 12
Aug. 2008 <http://www.businessandmedia.or/articles/2008/200808 12160747.aspx>). McDowell may
well have been taking his cues from Adam Thierer, of the think tank Progress and Freedom Foundation,
who published a more lengthy but no more well-reasoned argument equating network neutrality and the
fairness doctrine in October 2007 (Adam Thierer, "A Fairness Doctrine for the Internet," City Journal 18.3
(18 Oct. 2007) <http://www.city-journal.org/html/eon2007-10-18at.html>.) Thierer similarly fails to
explain how mandated content carriage under the doctrine parallels non-discriminatory transport
obligations, preferring to simply assert that it is so. It is hard to understand why, if network neutrality were
just another version of the fairness doctrine, we should not refer to all Title 11 common carrier obligations
as "the fairness doctrine." Plainly we do not, and this has not even occurred to policymakers in the several
decades of their co-existence - with good reason.
147Christopher S. Yoo, "Beyond Neutrality," Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 19 (Fall 2005)
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=742404>.
148 Yoo 9.
surface more competitors and the most efficient technologies. A variety of this argument
says that last-mile providers need discriminatory freedom in order to earn returns that
incentivize them to build out next-generation networks. Discrimination on the transport
layer is therefore beneficial. The only check on this behavior, according to this school of
thought, should be antitrust-like competitive analysis. Furthermore, even in the case in
which most consumers are left with a local monopoly, neutrality opponents argue that the
carriers will not have the incentives to discriminate "inefficiently" (although they may
very well discriminate). 14 9 These scholars generally would like to see
telecommunications regulation be turned into a sort of ex post antitrust analysis, 150
although they admit that antitrust courts may be ineffective at enforcing even that. ' The
solution is therefore to re-invent the FCC to be an antitrust-focused light-touch regulatory
agency.152
'49 Joseph Farrell and Philip J. Weiser, "Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies:
Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age," Harvard Journal of Law and
Technology 17.1 (2003): 85-134. Farrell and Weiser argue that carriers lack the incentives to discriminate
because of a feature they call "Internalizing Complementary Efficiencies." According to their analysis,
carriers benefit when there is a flourishing of different content and applications riding on top of their
networks (and they charge monopoly rents for network access). This is nevertheless subject to several
exceptions, including the fact that carriers may simply not know what is best for them. Barbara van
Schewick outlines several additional exceptions to this principle that are especially relevant in the internet
context. These exceptions are further broadened in an environment in which the access provider can subtly
discriminate without blocking altogether ("Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality
Regulation," Journal of Telecommunications & High Technology Law 5 [2007]:329-391). -In general, the
criteria of "inefficient" behavior in the "ICE" analysis boils down to whether or not the monopolist is
achieving the highest possible profit from the consumer (with the assumption that this maps cleanly to
greatest consumer welfare). In any event, the broadband market is increasingly a weakly competitive
duopoly, which undermines "ICE" behavior.
I50 Farrell and Weiser 134.
15' Yoo 69.
152 In 2005, the Progress and Freedom Foundation think-tank proposed the "Digital Age Communications
Act (S.2113), sponsored by Jim DeMint (R-SC). "In brief, DACA adopts an 'unfair competition' standard
which is based on competition law and economics and which is robust enough to deal with truly
anticompetitive instances of exclusion on the Internet, but without prejudging business practices that may
spur investment and deployment of new facilities and services. DACA's case-by-case approach to
Network Neutrality is superior, because it avoids thickets of ex ante rules while maintaining the availability
of ex post relief' (DACA Regulatory Framework Working Group,< http://www.pff.org/issues-
A second economic argument states that network neutrality is essentially a
recapitulation of the failed policy of common carriage. Bruce M. Owen claims that
regulatory structures are inherently subject to capture, which generates unworkable
inefficiencies." 53 Owen's retelling of history is remarkably selective. With little analysis,
he concludes that over a century of railroad common carriage regulation resulted in "a
series of highly discriminatory and dysfunctional regional transport cartels," and
describes telecommunications common carriage in the context of the drawn-out U.S. v.
AT&T antitrust proceedings in the early 1980's. Of course, the AT&T proceedings are
not so much a result of common carrier regulation as they are a complicated set of
decrees based on antitrust analysis. This is ironic, because Owen too proposes antitrust
as an ultimate safeguard. He also seeks to write off the Computer Inquiries, the series of
FCC proceedings which defined the different roles of regulators with respect to content
versus transport. Whereas many scholars believe that the Computer Inquiries facilitated
the flourishing of dial-up internet, 154 Owen inexplicably asserts that they ended in
"morasses of complex, unworkable, and ineffective or self-defeating regulations."'155 In
pubs/commun ications/other/031707dacastmt.pdf>). This antitrust-only style of thinking extends beyond the
now-dormant DACA group and is echoed by Philip J. Weiser and Robert D. Atkinson, who claim that "In
order to ensure that broadband providers do not abuse their market power, Congress should charge the FCC
with the responsibility of overseeing the use of discriminatory access arrangements to make sure that any
such arrangements do not harm competition (and consumers) ("A 'Third Way' on Network Neutrality, 30
May 2006 <http://www.itif.org/index.php?id=63>). I address this school of thought in more detail in
section 111.2.
153 Bruce M. Owen, "The Net Neutrality Debate: Twenty Five Years after United States v. AT&T and 120
Years after the Act to Regulate Commerce," John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law
School, Working Paper no. 336 (Feb. 2007) http://ssrn.com/abstract=963623;repub. with minor changes
and no footnotes as "Antecedents to Network Neutrality," Regulation 30.3, The Cato Institute (Fall
2007).Similar reasoning, and a similar mis-reading of the AT&T divestiture can be seen at
<http://techliberation.com/2008/04/1 8/what-did-he-say/>.
154 See, for example, Robert Cannon, "The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission's
Computer Inquiries," Federal Communications Law Journal 55 (2003): 167-206.
155 Owen, The Net Neutrality Debate 8.
any event, he fails to support his equally vague assertion that neutrality rules necessarily
imply the entire common carriage apparatus.
A third economic critique of network neutrality rules comes from C. Scott
Hemphill, who argues that network neutrality is in fact different from common carriage
in an important way. According to him, network neutrality is a "zero price rule" that
restricts carriers from the natural market practice of extracting maximum profit directly
from those who use their networks.156 Hemphill claims that even if one considers
common carriage to be a success historically, network neutrality is different in this regard
and therefore less economically efficient. The inefficiencies in network neutrality arise,
according to him, because carriers cannot directly extract rents from content providers
and must instead extract them indirectly from end users. However, in reality carriers do
earn profit from content providers indirectly via interconnection agreements - a fact that
Hemphill briefly acknowledges in a footnote but does not consider further.'157 Carriers
enter contracts on two sides of the market: one set of contracts is with their end-users and
the other is with internet backbone providers. The backbone contracts are known as
peering or transit agreements, and such agreements have existed since the dawn of the
commercial internet. These agreements contain detailed information about how much
traffic will be delivered with what quality of service. The internet backbone market is
156 His analysis is in fact deeper than this and involves delineating between exclusion and extraction. He
concludes that exclusion is unlikely because it is not in the carriers' economic interest. While exclusion
and extraction are indeed distinct incentives, they are inextricably linked in a discriminatory environment.
Last-mile providers do not necessarily choose just one or the other, and, in any event, discrimination
incentivized by one might well cause the other. For example, successful extraction may well necessitate
ongoing discrimination. Ultimately, this behavior can have the effect of preventing successful market entry
or profitability for those discriminated against. Even if such behavior does not cripple those entities
entirely, the practice enables the last-mile provider to introduce distortions in the market. Van Schewick
explains that carriers have the ability and incentive to discriminate in this fashion (p. 346).
':57 Hemphill n. 4.
unquestionably competitive. 158 These backbone providers then interconnect either
directly with the content providers, or indirectly through other carriers. This is what
makes the internet a "network-of-networks." Hemphill ignores this market structure,
concluding that last-mile providers should be free to negotiate directly with content
providers, despite the fact that they have no direct commercial relationship with them.
Yoo similarly conflates these markets. 59 However, if last-mile providers were permitted
to discriminate based on the source or content of particular traffic as a way of extracting
more profits, they would in fact be leveraging their local duopoly market power into the
competitive internet backbone market.' 60 Furthermore, they would be extracting profits
158 However, even this competitive landscape is not assured. Kevin Werbach notes, "With changes in the
backbone market, however, the traditional peering equilibrium could break down. The centripetal
dynamics at the physical layer of the Internet operate effectively because there has been no truly dominant
backbone. However, the possibilities for new arrangements are more acute today.... Consider one such
scenario. AT&T and Verizon are today the dominant Internet backbones. They are among the largest
backbones in terms of traffic and geographic coverage, but, more important, they are the only large
backbones to also control last-mile connectivity in significant parts of the country, and to have large
numbers of retail broadband subscribers. Verizon and AT&T might establish a 'Tier 0' peering relationship
with one another, and refuse to offer such peering to other backbones, even those today considered 'Tier 1'
peers" ("The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, and the Forces Tearing it
Apart," UC Davis Law Review (2008), pending <http://ssrn.com/abstract= 11 8435>).
159 "Indeed, there is no reason to expect that network owners will only attempt to engage in price
discriminate vis-it-vis end users. In a two-sided market, network owners are just as likely to try to price
discriminate with respect to content and applications providers as well." (Christopher S. Yoo, "Neutrality
and the Economics of Congestion," Georgetown Law Journal 94 [June 2006]: 1903
http://ssrn.com/abstract=825669). He also diagrams the two-sided network provider market as extending
from end-users to content/applications providers: Christopher S. Yoo, "What Can Antitrust Contribute to
the Network Neutrality Debate?" U. of Penn., Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper no. 07-11,
513 http://ssrn.com/abstract=992837.
160 Yoo admits that the last-mile market is concentrated. "Were network neutrality designed to promote
competition on the side of the market in which last-mile providers meet end users, the market would be
local in scope and sufficiently concentrated to provide an arguable basis for regulatory intervention" (Yoo,
"What Can Antitrust Law Contribute 514"). However, he attempts to define the market nationally,
claiming that the relevant scope is the field of all national broadband providers. According to his analysis,
no single broadband provider would be able to make a content/application provider completely non-viable
by blocking access in its region. To begin with, network neutrality proposals do of course address the last-
mile to the extent that consumer choice in the last mile is directly affected. Furthermore, antitrust analysis
has never sanctioned anticompetitive practice on the condition that the firm being harmed simply remains
viable. The case Yoo cites is Time Warner v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, (D.C. Cir. 2001), but in that case the
court considers viability "independent of concerns over anticompetitive conduct" (p. 1133). Regardless, the
content/application provider cannot go to one of the other national providers to reach the affected
customers. Those providers are not competitors for those customers. If his reasoning held, one might just
from a party with whom they have only an indirect relationship - precisely what
Hemphill claims is inefficient.
3. Internet Informed Policy
What most of these anti-neutrality economic positions have in common is that
they reduce the analysis almost entirely to antitrust considerations. 161 Antitrust is
concerned first with static conditions of competition, and at times the somewhat more
as well include all international broadband providers as well, making for a very rosy picture indeed. Yoo
also notes, "Network neutrality is not, however, designed to promote competition on [the consumer] side of
the market. Instead, its focus is to protect competition on the side of the market in which last-mile
providers meet content and applications providers." (Yoo, "What Can Antitrust Law Contribute?" 514).
Aside from the fact that last-mile providers do not "meet" the content/application providers at all (as I
noted above), this is beside the point: network neutrality is designed (in part) to make up for market
failures, not to create new transport-level competition. This is where neutrality rules differ from open
access rules of the sort that were denied under National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand
Xl Internet Services. There is no reason that the government could not simultaneously take steps to
encourage further last-mile market entry in other ways. Of course, this market entry is by no means
guaranteed, despite Yoo's insistence for several years that it was just around the corner if only it were
encouraged. Indeed, much-lauded efforts such as Broadband over Power Line (BPL) have largely failed.
This lends credence to the idea that even if last-mile service is not a natural monopoly, it is prone to remain
relatively non-competitive in the medium term. Wireless internet seems to be the most viable potential
competitor, but the competitive benefits are mitigated by the fact that the two largest wireless companies
are sister-companies of incumbent wireline companies. Furthermore, we are unlikely to see anything
approaching today's broadband speeds until there is widespread deployment of now-nascent 4G networks.
In short, the local last-mile is the appropriate market for antitrust analysis, it is concentrated, and likely to
remain so for some time.
'"1 Nuechterlein perhaps makes this point most forcefully, when he says, "the net neutrality controversy is
best understood as a classic antitrust dispute about 'vertical leveraging,' and the institutions most likely to
appreciate the economic complexities of that dispute are the nation's specialized antitrust agencies"
("Antitrust Oversight" 5). This statement assumes that "classic" understandings of competition are the best
match for the internet economy. It also assumes that any neutrality concern can be understood only as a
"vertical leveraging" question and that antitrust adjudication could provide timely, beneficial, and
determinate solutions. The roughly parallel example of the Microsoft litigation took more than 5 years
from conduct to remedy. Nuechterlein writes off other neutrality justifications as merely advancing a
"populist vision of the internet as a massive leveler of economic inequality" (p. 16) that seeks to "conform
the Internet to some utopian vision of an electronic town hall where anyone is guaranteed to speak as
loudly as anyone else" (p. 17). He cites political rhetoric about the internet being an enabler for a diversity
of business, but claims that different other economic realities (such as the ability to pay for competitive
services such as Content Delivery Network delivery) obliterated this ideal long ago. Whether or not access
gatekeepers should be permitted to artificially exacerbate this inequality is not addressed. In any event, he
claims that any neutrality claims are at their core about market power and market failure, which should
always be addressed through antitrust mechanisms. He believes that public interest mandates are
"infinitely malleable" (p. 23) and "conceptually empty" (p. 39). However, it is unclear how relatively static
"classic" antitrust principles would preserve space for dynamic innovation of applications and content -
regardless of whether such innovation were valued on the basis of equality of opportunity or long-term
economic growth.
dynamic notion of "Schumpeterian" competition (which I discuss further in Section III).
As doctrines like "essential facilities" fall out of favor, and more complex "network" or
"platform" analyses are still in their infancy, one must consider whether antitrust alone is
up to the task of standing in for broader notions of "the public interest."l 62 Indeed, FTC
Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch has expressed precisely this type of concern:
[A ls an agency focused on consumer protection and competition, I believe the
FTC has a role to play in broadband and Internet markets. At the same time, I
recognize that there are other perspectives of equal and even greater
importance. Internet access, like access to traditional forms of media and
communication, touches on broader public policy goals than economic
efficiency which has become the touchstone of antitrust law. 163
Network neutrality advocates have considerable economic firepower on their side
as well. To begin with, they engage antitrust analysis on its own terms, pointing out the
highly concentrated nature of last-mile access. However, many neutrality proponents
believe that antitrust (at least as practiced in the United States) can become an excuse for
doing nothing. Economists and lawyers seem to come up with endless ways of slicing
the relevant markets to support their particular conclusions. For example, the FCC itself
has been heavily criticized for its definition of the "broadband market." 64 The phrase
62 Barbara A. Cherry adds to this critique by reminding us that antitrust was never the justification for non-
discriminatory law in the first place and that the obligations first flowed from common law, which was
subsequently adopted into various statutory embodiments (and are now being undone in the name of
"deregulation"). ("Back to the Future: How Transportation Deregulatory Policies Foreshadow Evolution of
Communications Policies," The Information Society 24.5 (2008), pending.
163 J. Thomas Rosch, "Broadband Access Policy: The Role of Antitrust," Broadband Policy Summit IV:
Navigating the Digital Revolution, Washington, DC, 13 June 2008..
164 In particular, the FCC has included relatively slow connections in its broadband statistics and has
refused to release its non-aggregated data to the public. (See U.S., GAO, "Telecommunications:
Broadband Deployment Is Extensive Throughout the United States, But It Is Difficult to Assess the Extent
"free market" can become a euphemism for "never regulate."' 6 5 More fundamentally,
neutrality advocates emphasize that the economics of broadband do not conform to
traditional notions of firm-based competition. Instead, much economic growth and
innovation flows from diverse user production.1 66 On the internet, users become
producers, and the individual on a cable modem might invent the next web success story.
In this case, the economic analysis focuses instead on how well infrastructure providers
facilitate the myriad welfare-enhancing activities of network users. This relies not on
turn-of-the-twentieth-century notions of industrial economics but rather on contemporary
"emergence economics" that treats networks as agent-driven complex adaptive
systems.167 Emergence economics does not assume that all entities have perfect
knowledge of the market or that every profit is completely captured. Furthermore, it
treats this as a beneficial feature that feeds networked growth. The more users and the
more uses that are allowed, the more economic production and social welfare is
generated. I will discuss this in more detail in Section 111.2.
Neutrality advocates point out that network discrimination wrests control out of
the hands of users or content/application providers and places it in the hands of the
of Deployment Gaps in Rural Areas," 10 [2006] <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06426.pdf>; S. Derek
Turner, "Broadband Reality Check II: The Truth Behind America's Digital Decline," [2006]
<http://www.freepress.net/docs/bbrc2-final.pdf>). The Commission has subsequently changed the way it
reports broadband deployment data going forward, but this may simply provide more fodder for the pundits
(Development of Nationwide Broadband Data to Evaluate Reasonable and Timely Deployment of
Advanced Services to All Americans, Improvement of Wireless Broadband Subscribership Data, and
Development of Data on Interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VolP) Subscribership, WC Docket
No. 07-38, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 08-89 [rel. 12 June 2008]).
165 This tendency appears strongly when scholars focus narrowly on the most extreme Chicago School
analyses. Such myopia fails to recognize the many "externalities" present in network economies.
F'rischmann and Van Schewick take Yoo to task for precisely this reason. (Brett M. Frischmann and
Barbara van Schewick, "Network Neutrality and the Economics of an Information Superhighway: A Reply
to Professor Yoo," Jurimetrics 47: 409-420, pending.)
',6See, e. g., Frischmann and Lemley.
1,57 Whitt and Schultze.
carriers. They challenge the notion that network providers are best suited to choose
which uses of the network should be prioritized or to predict what future uses will be
most economically beneficial. Discrimination, as opposed to outright blocking, can be
particularly damning to innovative new uses. For example, slower treatment of certain
Voice-over-IP traffic, peer-to-peer traffic, or "lower tier" web sites can make them
unattractive or even unusable. This may all take place without the user's knowledge and
may even shield the network provider from customer backlash. 168 Discrimination
sacrifices the yet-unknown uses and innovations of the users for the short-term known
interests of the carrier.
Fundamentally, most pro-neutrality economic arguments view the internet as
infrastructure. Sometimes this view is articulated in the context of economic analysis, 69
but it is also described as an internet norm. Early open access and network neutrality
debates often came to a head over what is called the "end-to-end" principle.170 The
simplest version of this principle states that end-users should control what they transmit,
and the network operators should deliver these communications in best-efforts fashion.
The design of the Internet Protocol, with its layered structure, has permitted users to
invent new applications and protocols on top of the "dumb" network. 17 This design
principle has been the norm since the beginning and has led to engineering and social
expectations that carriers do not dictate the terms of use.
168 Van Schweick, "Towards an Economic Framework."
169 Waller and Frischmann.
170 Mark A. Lemley and Lawrence Lessig, "The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the
Internet in the Broadband Era," UCLA Law Review 48 (2001): 925-972.
171David Isenberg, "The Dawn of the Stupid Network," A CM Netvorker 2.1 (Feb./Mar. 1998): 24-31.
The "netheads" have a radically different set of expectations than the phone or
cable company. The wireline operators for the most part designed intelligence "into" the
network rather than place it at the "edges." The circuit-switched phone network is a
prime example. Phone users traditionally received new features only when the phone
company chose to offer them, and those services were operated by the phone company.
The content available on cable television has always been programmed by the cable
company, typically with a limited set of take-it-or-leave-it channel packages. Early dial-
up internet represented a creative hack. Only with the help of common carriage, the
Computer Inquiries, and Carterphone was the internet able to survive on top of the
highly controlled telephone network. As users migrated to broadband and other forms of
convergence took hold, the technology and regulatory structure no longer ensured
peaceful co-existence. This led to what some have called the "nethead vs. bellhead"
confrontation.172 This difference of principles undoubtedly exists, and network neutrality
is a key battleground.
However, upon further inspection the dichotomy need not be absolute. Even early
internet engineers admit that absolute end-to-end neutrality has never existed. In the
early days of the internet's predecessor, the NSFNet, it was necessary for a period of time
to prioritize terminal sessions that demanded low latency versus file transfers that
demanded high throughput.173 Today, network operators intervene to block spam or
viruses. If the government can identify and enforce cases in which end-to-end use should
172 Indeed, a 2004 conference of the same name sought to bring together telecom lawyers and internet
advocates (some of whom were also lawyers). See http://www.cardozobellhead.net/.
173 Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason and Hal Varian, "Economic FAQs about the Internet," The Journal of
Economic Perspectives 8.3 (Summer 1994): 75-96 <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3336451.0001.110>.
give way to certain types of socially beneficial network management, then there may be a
productive compromise between "netheads" and "bellheads."
My perspective is that the policy dialogue is skewed too far in favor of carrier
discretion. The radical turn toward competition-only policy in the last twenty years, and
the difficulty of clearly defining what makes for "reasonable network management" (in
the words of the "Internet Freedoms" policy statement), leads many policymakers to
throw up their hands and defer to the market. However, our understanding of "the
market" has fallen far behind networked market realities. Antitrust is ill prepared to
explain the economics of user-based production, multi-sided markets, platform
economics, and network effects. The proposal that we suspend ex ante rulemakings in
favor of ex post enforcement from an agency structure that does not yet exist seems like a
recipe for doing nothing at all. In any event, such a structure is likely to create confusion
and indeterminacy in the market.174 The FCC is currently attempting to navigate this
174 Jonathan E. Nuechterlein and Philip J. Weiser note that "The more basic problem with relying on
antitrust courts to superintend the telecommunications industry is that the judicial process is deficient in the
areas of determinacy and expertise. Consider determinacy first. Companies with market power need to
know now, not at the end of a multi-year antitrust suit, whether the aggressive business strategy they are
contemplating will subject them to treble damages under the Sherman Act in the future" (rlein and Philip J.
Weiser, "First Principles for an Effective Rewrite of the Telecommunications Act of 1996," AEl-Brookings
Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Working Paper 05-03 (Mar. 2005): 27
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=707124>). The authors go on to explain that nevertheless, the current FCC
procedures generate indeterminacy because of inevitable politicization of the process and extended
rulemakings or adjudication. Two years later, in comments to the FCC co-authored by Nuechterlein,
AT&T claims that "the quick resolution of the Madison River controversy confirms that ex post remedies,
including antitrust actions, are more than adequate to deal with the threat of any recurrence" (Reply
Comments ofA T& T Inc., 17 July 2007, WC Docket No. 07-52). The "Madison River controversy" refers
to a case in which the FCC acted against anticompetitive discrimination by ISP Madison River (resolved in
Consent Decree, FCC DA 05-543). Given the fact that this action took place under the Title II common-
carrier provisions, which under the Brand X decision may no longer apply, it is hard to understand why this
example adds any level of certainty to enforcement. In any event, AT&T claims, "the common-carrier-type
'nondiscrimination' rules favored by some net neutrality advocates would chill the free-wheeling
experimentation at the heart of the Internet's success and would embroil the industry in years of
indeterminate litigation about the reasonableness of highly technical network-management decisions made
in a rapidly evolving business environment" (Comments ofA T& T Inc., 15 June 2007, WC Docket No. 07-
52). It is far from clear that antitrust-like adjudication, even the imagined expedited system of DACA or its
variants, would perform better. More likely, the effect of this line of reasoning is resistance of any
difficult in-between space by enforcing its policy statement on an ad hoc basis. The
Commission faces jurisdictional and merit-based challenges, and it is hard to imagine the
current process being sustainable in the long run.'175 The initial round of proposed
network neutrality legislation may have been too blunt a tool for fashioning the
appropriate "reasonable network management" safeguards, but future efforts could prove
more viable. Ideally, statutes should provide a guide to regulators who institute the more
refined rules adaptive to the conditions at hand. Currently, the Commission is operating
without a map.
enforcement whatsoever. The claim that pure antitrust can do a better job is at best speculative and at worst
a red herring.
'75 Indeed, this blossomed into an all-out regulatory brawl in the summer of 2008, when Comcast and its
opponents traded arguments in public comments in FCC Docket 07-52. Free Press had filed a complaint
against Comcast, alleging that the company blocked peer-to-peer traffic in violation of the Commission's
Policy Statement. Comcast argued that the policy statement did not constitute enforceable rules and as
such was arbitrary and capricious. They noted Chairman Martin's own comments upon voting for the
Policy Statement in 2005, in which he stated that "policy statements do not establish rules nor are they
enforceable documents" (see http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DOC-260435A2.pdf).
Comcast also argued that the Commission did not have the right to act under its broad "Title I" jurisdiction.
Free Press pointed out that at that very same moment, Comcast was claiming in Federal court that the FCC
was the only entity with the jurisdiction to act. It further explained that the Commission has long made
rules through case-by-case adjudication and without explicit rules. They also pointed out many potential
statutory sources for authority to act. One of the most interesting components of this debate nwas the fact
that Comcast argued that the Commission did not have jurisdiction under the 1979 case FCC vs. Midwest
Video Corp (440 U.S. 689). In that case, the Court decided that the FCC could not impose what amounted
to common carriage obligations on cable companies because they were functionally equivalent to
broadcasters and statute had not yet given the Commission explicit authority to regulate cable: ".Congress
has restricted the Commission's ability to advance objectives associated with public access at the expense
of the journalistic freedom of persons engaged in broadcasting.... The Commission may not regulate cable
systems as common carriers, just as it may not impose such obligations on television broadcasters"
(Midwest Video 706, 709). It is not clear whether this type of reasoning still holds in light of the Cable Act,
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, other statutory changes since 1979, or the general
evolution of cable technology away from broadcast-like operations. On August 1, 2008, the Commission
voted 3-2 to discipline Comcast in "trust-but-verify" fashion - it would not impose a fine but would instead
monitor Comcast's promise to implement a "content agnostic" traffic management system. On August 20,
2008, the Commission released its formal order. The order took the "kitchen sink" approach to its
jurisdiction, citing authority from "sections 1,2(a), 4(i), 4(j), 201(b), 230(b), 256, 257, 303(r), 403, and 601
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§151, 152(a), 154(i), 154(j), 201(b), 230(b),
256, 257, 303(r), 403, 521, and section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996" (paragraph 57). Much
of the most compelling language about the nature of the internet and the Commission's mandate to preserve
that nature draws from §230(b), the remnants of the Communications Decency Act (in particular, the order
discusses these elements in paragraphs 12-14). Comcast is expected to appeal the order.
Thomas Nachbar has argued that the ideal non-discrimination rule would prevent
user-based discrimination but allow carriers to discriminate based on use. Under this
regime, providers would be able to choose which services they support (and how they
prioritize or discriminate among them), but they would be required to offer the same deal
to everyone. Google could not pay for faster delivery than Yahoo. He reasons that user
discrimination is easier to define than use discrimination and less prone to regulatory
abuse. He envisions this user-based neutrality as enforced by "standards" and not law or
formal rules. 176 Furthermore, he claims that mandating uniform treatment of all packets
would discourage applications that require prioritization or quality of service guarantees,
making it a type of discrimination itself. To be sure, networks that treat all traffic
uniformly make it more difficult to use certain applications. However, Nachbar's core
criticism appears to be not that someone will be choosing how to prioritize, but rather that
in some neutrality regimes the government would be choosing. The best entity to choose,
on his account, is the last-mile provider.
I disagree. Both use and user non-discrimination should be policy goals. It
makes sound economic sense, it is consistent with historical non-discrimination
precedent, and it supports the internet ethos of diverse uses and abundance of peers.
Historically, use and user were closely linked, and non-discrimination in one area could
ensure non-discrimination in the other. For example, the Computer II rules mandated
only that carriers not discriminate based on the phone number called. However, because
of the simplistic circuit-switched technology (and the Carterphone right to attach
176 It is unclear what these "standards" might be, other than the existing standards within the internet
protocol, which have clearly been ignored in cases such as the recent Comcast/BitTorrent back-and-forth.
As such, I am not sure what real force they would bring to bear on the situation aside from the
unsustainable ad hoc complaint adjudication that the Commission is currently undertaking.
devices), the rules ensured that use-based discrimination would not occur. Today, user-
based discrimination protects only against a subset of harms, which in any event might
already be addressable under antitrust doctrine. 77 It does not ensure that carriers support
applications that they do not think will be profitable, or that compete with their non-
internet offerings, or that have not yet been invented. The problem is that surrendering
use-based discrimination to last-mile providers would surrender the general-purpose
infrastructure in the interest carrier-profit-oriented incentives. In fact, it discriminates
against users with business models or non-commercial modes of production that rely on
technology uses not approved by the carrier. The technology of the internet presents us
with a choice we have not had to make historically because user-based neutrality has
always implied use-based neutrality. Nachbar is prepared to give up on use neutrality
while I am not.
One way to maintain use-based non-discrimination by carriers would be to place
prioritization control in the hands of the users. Most content/application providers have
the opportunity to exercise this control by going to any number of competitive backbone
providers. Different backbone providers ensure different levels of quality-of-service
guarantees for common metrics like latency, throughput, and jitter (at least, up to the
edge of their networks). End users, who are accessing this content or these applications
or are connecting with each other in peer-to-peer fashion, do not have the ability to
choose different prioritization via competitive providers or by specifying preferences to
S77 Of course, given the uncertainty of the applicability of antitrust in this area, these harms might not be
addressable under its doctrines. In any event, rules would provide a great deal more clarity when it comes
to user-based neutrality.
their provider. Indeed, even across-the-board neutrality may disfavor particular
applications users wish to use, although this may be more appropriate and efficient than
the last-mile provider's blanket imposition of prioritization. A better solution would
allow end-users to easily control the prioritization of their own traffic, within the tier of
service that they have purchased from their provider. Such a solution might implement a
more sophisticated "Type of Service" style component into some layer of the network
protocol, after being defined via a standards group such as the IETF.'78 This approach
recognizes that different users have different usage needs and places the control in their
hands. It refuses to foreclose on new uses simply because the network owner did not
think of them first, and it catalyzes innovation at the "edges." It is not true to absolute
neutrality, but it is true to fundamental principles of non-discrimination and the internet
ethos. From a "free market" perspective, it places knowledge and decision-making
capacity in the hands of the entities with the power to make purchase decisions. Such an
approach is unlikely to garner initial favor with carriers because it preserves user control,
178 David Reed stated (FCC En Banc Public Hearing on Broadband Network Management Practice at
Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA [25 Feb. 2008]), "There were a wide range of actual standards that
would allow Comcast to manage and prioritize traffic, including diffserv, ECN, RED..."
(<http://www.fcc.gov/broadband_network management/022508/reed.pdf>). One might add to this list the
RSVP protocol (RFC 2205) and other methods that use flow-based prioritization (such as the method
described in John L. Adams, Lawrence G. Roberts, and Avril Ijsselmuiden, "Changing the Internet to
Support Real-time Content Supply from a Large Fraction of Broadband Residential Users," BT Technology
Journal 23.2 (Apr. 2005): 217-231. Some of these tools can be used by network operators to choose their
own discriminatory practices, or they might be implemented in such a way as enable user-based control.
Early internet engineer David Clark recently remarked (video recording
<http://www.fcc.gov/broadband network management/hearing-ma022508.html> at 4:24:45), "I don't like
the idea of the ISP assigning quality of service to an application. If there is going to be any discrimination
in terms of quality of service that's associated with some packets rather than others, I would prefer that the
bits which select those packets for enhanced service be set by the user. The user could say 'this telephone
call is really important. I want this telephone call to go through.' Imagine that in any given month, ten
percent of your traffic could be high priority. You could say, 'this is it, I want it here.' It could be my
choice as to whether that's a phone call or a game, or I'm trying to get a bid into eBay or whatever I'm
trying to do. I would like the user to be able to assign those priorities. If you look at the way that internet
telephony is done today, those bits are set by the phone device. It's not set by the ISP. It's the phone device
that says, 'this is a phone call and therefore I will set these bits,' and if the ISP chooses to honor these bits
then these packets will go through better. That's something that could be superimposed on top of the basic
idea of usage quotas."
because it nevertheless resolves their "congestion" justification, and because it would
take more technical and cooperational work than blunt discrimination. The appropriate
policy path to this outcome might involve a use-neutrality mandate on last-mile providers
with an exception for user-specified, standards-defined prioritization.
A user-based prioritization scheme would require some level of agreement, either
via standard or law, that carriers would respect the indications of the last-mile users
(presuming the users had paid for such prioritization). This would require agreement on
what different quality-of-service flags meant and transparency from the provider about
how they implemented such flags. It would require vigilance to ensure that the last-mile
providers practices were in keeping with what users believed that they had paid for. This
would suggest an ongoing role for the FCC, perhaps with additional competitive
safeguards and adjudication aid from the FTC. I believe that this regulatory overhead
would nevertheless be worth the overhead because it places market knowledge and
decision-making power in the hands of the end-users who are making purchase and
access decisions.
The historical roots of the public interest standard remind us that communication
infrastructure is special. Protecting against monopolistic abuse is only part of the
equation. It is equally important that users are free to conduct business, speak, and
innovate on top of that infrastructure. Some form of neutrality-like regulatory safeguard
is likely to be the most clear, enforceable, and historically congruent way of achieving
this end. In Section III, I will explain how historical principles of the public interest
might be transformed in the era of the internet in such a way that policymakers might
craft such a rule.
B. SPECTRUM ALLOCATION
For decades, much of the debate over the use of radio frequencies focused on how
the government determined which lucky few would obtain licenses to broadcast. As the
focus shifted toward two-way radio operations and the nascent cellular phone business,
the government continued its policy of giving away licenses based on "comparative
hearings." The first round of cellular licenses was allocated in this way, and the
Commission chose the existing wireline incumbents. 179 In the years that followed,
auctions eventually replaced these "beauty contests" on the Coasian theory that those
willing to pay the most for frequencies would also be those most likely to use them
efficiently. However, the Commission still had to determine the rules governing the
auctions, which would of course influence the outcomes. Meanwhile, another school of
thought advocated for the unlicensed use of spectrum on the theory that new technologies
made it possible to treat some spectrum as a commons. The current debate over spectrum
policy involves weighing the merits of property versus commons approaches, as well as
creative solutions in between. The answers depend on how well property-oriented
efficiency aligns with the public interest, to what degree technology enables unlicensed
use, and even whether spectrum should still be considered scarce.
In 2002, the FCC convened a "Spectrum Policy Task Force" (SPTF) to perform a
comprehensive re-examination of how the Commission managed the airwaves. 80 It had
179 Second Report and Order, An Inquiry into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHZ for
Cellular Communications Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 469 (1981).
180 Spectrum Policy Task Force, ET Docket No. 02-135, Report (rel. Nov. 2002)
<http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-228542A 1 .pdf>.
become increasingly clear that the traditional "command and control" model, in which
the Commission decided precisely how each block of spectrum was used, was not
keeping up well with the evolving uses. There was a considerable amount of spectrum
left under-used because it was locked into out-of-date usage allocations or controlled by
government or commercial entities. The long-held belief in spectrum policy was that the
government was justified in deciding who had a right to use this scarce public resource
only because it made for more efficient usage. The SPTF investigated various
alternatives to the traditional top-down approach and determined that there were at least
two ways to make spectrum usage more "flexible" without introducing interference:
greater propertization and a variety of unlicensed uses.
1. Property, Commons, and Scarcity
When Ronald Coase first proposed the idea that spectrum should be bought and
sold,"' most thought that his proposal was absurd.182 Most policymakers at the time saw
the spectrum as property of the public, and such privatization offended their sensibilities.
Furthermore, Coase argued that even the government and public safety users should have
to pay for the spectrum they use. As the theory goes, making licenses more property-like
would cause market forces to allocate the scarce resources to those best able to monetize
them efficiently - and efficient monetization was the only type of efficiency that existed
S'Coase.
'82 Thomas Hazlett, "The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas,
and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's 'Big Joke': An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy," Harvard
Journal of Law and Technology 14.2 (Spring 2001): 335-567
<http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v14/14HarvJLTech335 .pdf>.
from this economic perspective. This was, after all, the way many scarce resources were
allocated:
But it is a commonplace of economics that almost all resources used in the
economic system economic system (and not simply radio and television
frequencies) are limited in amount and scarce, in that people would like to use
more than exists. Land, labor, and capital are all scarce, but this, of itself, does
not call for government regulation. It is true that some mechanism has to be
employed to decide who, out of the many claimants, should be allowed to use
the scarce resource. But the way this is usually done in the American
economic system is to employ the price mechanism, and this allocates
resources to users without the need for government regulation.'8 3
It was only in 1993 that Congress warmed up to Coase's idea.'84 Comparative hearings
had given way to random lottery assignments of spectrum, which were a disaster by all
accounts. By this time, faith in markets had spread and the FCC began auctioning some
frequencies. 185
183 Coase, 14. Gerald R. Faulhaber and David J. Farber re-state the Coasian argument as such: "The market
is a far more powerful and efficient allocator of resources than administrators and bureaucrats can ever be,
no matter how knowledgeable and well intentioned. Efficient markets can realize their magic because they
are highly decentralized processors of information. Prices are determined by buyers and sellers interacting
in the market, to ensure that demand and supply are equated. The ability of the market price to capture all
the information regarding supply and demand is far greater than that of a centralized planner no matter how
sophisticated their planning and allocation tools" .("Spectrum Management: Property Rights, Markets, and
The Commons," AEI-Brookings Working Paper 02-12 [Dec. 2002]: 7
<http://rider.wharton.upenn.edu/-faulhabe/SPECTRU MMANAGEMENTv51 .pdf>.
184 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No 103-66, § 6002, 107 Stat. 312, 379-86
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)).
185 Since that time, the Commission has continued to extend auctions to more and more bands. In 2002, an
FCC working paper echoed the fundamental Coase theorem before recommending more extensive
propertization of the airwaves: "The current administrative allocation of spectrum has led to shortages and
waste. Markets can move spectrum to its highest value use both now and in the future, even as technology
and consumer preferences change" (Evan R. Kwerel. and John R. Williams, "A Proposal for Rapid
Transition to Market Allocation of Spectrum," U.S. Federal Communications Commission Office of Plans
Most justifications for property-like allocation of spectrum begin by recounting
the failures of the previous systems. Around 2000, a group of scholars began arguing for
the "commons" approach, starting with this same observation but proposing a radically
different solution.' 86 They observed that scarcity and interference might be solved by
using new technologies that could share the spectrum without external regulation.
Pointing to the success of technologies like WiFi, they observed that "smart" devices
could intelligently coordinate simultaneous use of the airwaves. They further observed
that such use would be even more decentralized than a property-based approach, would
preserve space for a variety of uses, and would catalyze innovation in devices. Perhaps
most importantly, it would avoid placing a gatekeeper between citizens and their use of
the airwaves. Such flexibility of use and user resonated with the internet ethos, and
indeed many proponents of this approach advocated for internet-informed approaches to
other issues, like as intellectual property.
The Spectrum Policy Task Force ultimately suggested a mixture of property and
commons approaches, saying that the Commission should "Expand the use of both the
exclusive rights and commons models, and move away from the command-and-control
model, with limited exceptions."'8 7 However, it recommended that generally spectrum
below 5 GHz should be delegated for licensed use and unlicensed use above 50 GHz. 88
and Policy Working Paper no. 38 [2002].)
186 Yochai Benkler, "Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digitally Networked
Environment," Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 11.2 (1998): 287-400.; Yochai Benkler, "Some
Economics of Wireless Communications," Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 16.1 (2002): 25-83;.
Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World (New York:
Random House, 2001); Kevin Werbach, "Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless
Communication," Texas Law Review 82.4 (2004): 863-973.
"87 Spectrum Policy Task Force 52.
"" Spectrum Policy Task Force 38, 39.
Presumably the frequencies from 5-50 GHz were less clear-cut from the SPTF's
perspective. The task force was concerned that lower-frequency signals propagate further
and are more likely to crowd out or interfere with far-away users. Unfortunately, this
limits the likelihood that unlicensed use can evolve into useful long or medium-distance
uses. 189 One problem with drawing such lines is the fact that new technologies,
innovative business models, or unique spectrum circumstances might make unlicensed
use more attractive in bands previously thought to be off limits. Once spectrum is
propertized it is very difficult to convert it back to unlicensed use. The SPTF itself
admitted that its recommendations were not hard-and-fast rules. In any event,
considerably more valuable spectrum has been devoted to exclusive property-like use
than to unlicensed use.190
Alongside the property versus commons debate, there has emerged a call for the
end of scarcity as a rationale for regulating the airwaves. The reasoning is that new
technologies have ushered in an era of abundance that obviates the need for centralized
governmental decision-making. J. W. Berresford somewhat implausibly argues that
because spectrum is not a "tangible thing," the scarcity rationale for regulating broadcast
is incorrect as a matter of scientific fact.' 91 He furthermore claims that
189 For many years since the inception of WiFi, municipalities have tried to deploy free municipal service.
There are many reasons why these efforts have largely failed, but one major factor has been the low power
and short range of WiFi, which required deployment of far more base stations than would be financially
viable.
190 One exception has been the 3650-3700MHz rules. (Opinion and Order, FCC Document 07-99 [rel. June
7, 2007].) However, unlicensed devices in this band are constrained to be used only outside of various
geographical areas (including many metropolitan areas) due to potential interference with other users. This
reduces the likelihood of widespread consumer adoption of such devices. Such an allocation demonstrates
the Commission's general approach of resorting to unlicensed allocation only when propertization is not
viable.
191 J. W Berresford, "The Scarcity Rationale for Regulating Traditional Broadcasting: An Idea Whose Time
Has Passed," FCC Media Bureau Staff Research Papers (2005): 9.
Perhaps most damaging to The Scarcity Rationale is the recent accessibility of
all the content on the Internet, including eight million blogs, via unlicensed
spectrum and WiFi and WiMax devices. The Scarcity Rationale, based on the
scarcity of channels, has been severely undermined by plentiful channels.' 92
Berresford overlooks the reality that the unlicensed spectrum required to access the
Internet is highly scarce compared to its propertized counterpart, and that longer-
range technologies like WiMax have no permission whatsoever to operate on
unlicensed spectrum (at least at meaningful power levels). Indeed, the fact that some
blocks of spectrum are currently fetching billions of dollars at auction indicates that
they are scarce enough that corporations value them highly. Indeed, as Faulhaber and
Farber note, "If resources are not scarce, if consumers can pick their food off trees
that are never exhausted and if there is infinite bandwidth, then there is simply no
need to have markets, which have costs to organize, administer and maintain." 93
It seems clear that scarcity is still a major reality when it comes to radio spectrum.
Nevertheless, what we can learn from these calls for the end of the scarcity rationale is
that the degree of scarcity is not fixed in stone. It relies on policy decisions about the
allocation and usage rules on spectrum. These policy decisions influence scarcity-
affecting decisions of market actors. A company seeking to optimize its profits will
choose who can use "its" spectrum, and how. This allows the gatekeeper to generate a
kind of artificial scarcity based upon its private motives. Likewise, new technologies -
and whether or not they can be put into use - affect scarcity. In many cases, the move to
digitization allows more information to be packed into less bandwidth. Technologies
192 Berresford 11.
193 Faulhaber and Farber 8.
may also introduce scarcity as they give gatekeepers more fine-grained control. From the
perspective of the internet ethos, the question is whether particular regulatory decisions
will, on balance, encourage abundance of users and uses.
2. The 700 MHz Auction
For decades, television broadcasters enjoyed a broad swath of highly valuable
spectrum. This spectrum was valuable because of its relatively low frequency, which
meant that signals could easily travel long distances and permeate buildings. As over-
the-air broadcasting has waned, many of these valuable channels go unused. As the
United States faces a mandated switch to digital transmission in February 2009 (and a
juggling of licensee frequencies), the FCC has recognized a valuable opportunity to re-
assign some of this "wasted" spectrum. In the Summer of 2007, the Commission
solicited comments on how to auction a portion of this spectrum in the 700 MHz band
such that it would be most likely to be used for next-generation telecommunications
technologies like wireless broadband. 194
The politicking was heated, and the proposals were complicated. The
Commission had to decide how to divide up the portions to be auctioned, both in terms of
frequency width and geographic reach of each license. These seemingly administrative
decisions had the potentially to radically affect which entities could viably bid and win
licenses - for example, regional or rural wireless providers would not be able to outbid
larger companies for nationwide licenses. Issues related to bid disclosure, "package"
bidding, "designated entities" credits for underprivileged bidders, and build-out
194 Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 07-72, (rel. April 27, 2007). In the
interest of full disclosure, I worked for Google during the comment period for this proceeding and
contributed to research and drafting of some of the relevant comments.
requirements further complicated the lobbying landscape. The complexity of these many
decisions leading up to the auction rules makes it clear that there is no such thing as a
"]pure" auction in which "the market decides." Auction rules are the locus of normative
decisions that are influenced by corporate lobbying, public interest concerns, and politics.
In this case, public interest groups teamed up with Google and others to argue that
whoever won the spectrum should be required to adhere to certain "openness"
conditions. 195 These conditions would require the winning bidder to allow users to
operate any devices and applications on its network, as well as require wholesale and
interconnection access for competing providers. Despite the fact that the Commission
was statutorily prohibited from considering auction revenue when it set the rules, the
conventional wisdom was that the Treasury expected them to deliver major funds.
Leading up to the release of the rules, leaks indicated that with respect to one of the key
"blocks" of spectrum - referred to as the "C" block - the FCC was considering some of
the "openness" principles. However, in parallel it was considering a reserve price of $4.6
billion for that block so that if the bidding did not reach that level there would be a new
auction without the conditions. Google's CEO Eric Schmidt took the unconventional
approach of writing a public letter directly to Chairman Martin, pledging to bid at least
the reserve price if the Commission adopted all four "openness" conditions.' 96 AT&T
"5 Comments of Google Inc. on WC Docket 06-150 etc. (9 July 2007)
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native or pdf=pdf&id document=6519548049; Comments
of the Public Interest Spectrum Coalition on WC Docket 06-150 etc. (6 July 2007)
<http://gullfoss2 .fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native orpdf=pdf&id_document=6519540425>.
196 Ex Parte letter of Eric Schmidt, CEO of Google, 20 July 2007, WC Docket No. 06-160
httn://gullfoss2.fcc.aov/orod/ecfs/retrieve.cai?native or odf=Ddf&id document=6519559297.
and the wireless industry in general replied that Google's proposal was "corporate
welfare." 97
The Commission's final order struck a compromise on many of the issues at
stake. 198 The "open devices" / "open applications" rules were adopted, while the more
aggressive openness proposals were not incorporated. When bidding concluded months
later, it was revealed that Google had indeed bid up to the reserve price on the "C" block
but that Verizon had cast the winning bid. Telecommunications analyst Blair Levin
quipped that because of the openness conditions on Verizon, "Google is the happy
loser." 199 While the news reports were dominated by analysis of which big company
really "won," many missed the more fundamental public interest issues at stake.
The openness conditions in many ways mirrored traditional non-discrimination
public interest safeguards. The conditions seek to preserve the freedom of users to use
the network as they chose and to access it with any device that did not cause harm to the
network. The former resembles a weaker form of Computer Inquiries application non-
discrimination, and the latter condition mirrors the Carterphone decision of 1968.200
There are many potential loopholes in the rules. Indeed, no sooner had the rules been
decided than Verizon began lobbying for a weak interpretation and Google began
197 Ex Parte letter of Robert W. Quinn, Jr., on behalf of of AT&T, 12 July 2007, FCC WC Docket No. 06-
150 <http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or pdf=pdf&id document=6519555670>.
CTIA, the wireless industry trade group, took out full-page ads in trade magazines with largely the same
message.
98 Second Report and Order, FCC 07-132 (rel. 10 Aug. 2007).
199 Saul Hansell, "Verizon and AT&T Win Big in Auction of Spectrum," New York Times, 21 March
2008<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/2 I/technology/21 auction.html>.
200 Tim Wu, "Wireless Carterfone," International Journal of Communication 1 (2007): 389
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=962027>.
counter-lobbying. 201 I described earlier why I think that the combination of common
carriage, the Computer Inquiries, and Carterphone were necessary for an environment
that fostered the flourishing of early consumer internet access. In the wireless context, I
believe that similar flexibility of use is essential to maintaining historical non-
discriminatory access in this new medium, as well as preserving the internet ethos that
has led to innovation and free speech online.
Thomas Nachbar believes that defining this use neutrality is too difficult, that
regulators will tend to define it in such a way that it constrains innovation, that the rules
will not affect positive behavior anyway, and that the competitive market will better solve
any concerns. 202 Undoubtedly, the "openness" conditions in the 700 MHz auction were
defined at a high level and were a result of political compromise. Of course, the
Commission has long promulgated broad principles or rules to guide industry behavior
and then specified particular guidelines or adjudicated on individual bases. 203 Nachbar
goes on to claim that the rules were defined "in a specific, technologically dependent
formula"204 and that "imposing use neutrality requires addressing questions of design." 205
This claim is hard to understand, given that the mandate to allow all devices and
applications is clearly divorced from particular technologies and indeed are designed to
open the possibility to unforeseen technologies. This is the heart of technology: agnostic
network modularity. Nachbar would also have us believe that the rules represent only a
20 Ex parte letter from Richard S. Whitt, Google, WT Docket No. 06-150 (1 Oct. 2007)
<http ://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native or pdf=pdf&iddocument=6519738920>.
202 Nachbar,80-89.
203 Elsewhere, Nachbar endorses precisely this approach (p. 90).
204 Nachbar 81.
205 Nachbar 88.
weak form of Carterphone, which alone will be ineffective.206 This ignores the full
implications of the open-applications provision, which extends the non-discriminatory
mandate into the network.207 It appears that Nachbar and I agree that two-sided openness
(user device and network access) would be necessary to encourage meaningful openness,
but that we disagree as to whether this can be done through wireless use neutrality. 208
Nachbar instead sees promise in profit-motivated market actors. He makes much of the
somewhat competitive wireless carrier market.20 9 However, it is clear that carriers all
206 "The rules adopt a version of what has become known as 'Wireless Carterfone"' (Nachbar 81).
207 To be sure, whether or not this is the case could be disputed. Nachbar's narrow interpretation is that the
provision only limits "the ability of carriers to prevent consumers from loading and running third
applications on those openly accessible devices" (p. 81). Even if the 700 MHz rules as adopted did not
effectively mandate use neutrality in the network, this does not mean that the approach should be
abandoned altogether but rather that such rules should perhaps be more explicitly defined. I am
considerably more hopeful that it is possible to do this than is Nachbar. This is essentially the same
question that plays out in the broader network neutrality debate that I discussed earlier.
208 Nachbar states that "from a consumer standpoint, the product is the combination of device (or
application) and carriage" (p. 82). I agree. I remain confused, however, about why he sings the praises of
the Computer Inquiries while maintaining that use neutrality is categorically a bad idea. I am not
persuaded by the argument that the IP environment is fundamentally different from the circuit-switched
environment in such a way that use neutrality is impossible or undesirable.
209 "But the wireless markets of today are not like the wireline market that AT&T operated in years ago.
Today's wireless carriers face 2 competitors in over 90% of their markets, and therefore have far less
market power than AT&T did" (Nachbar 82) Nachbar goes on to perform an analysis of the market
incentives of wireless operators that I believe is fundamentally flawed on several accounts. He begins by
noting the "internalizing complementary efficiencies" phenomenon and claiming that "If wireless carriers
actually do have market power, then opening device and application markets to competition will have no
effect on their ability to charge monopoly rents" (p. 82). Of course, neither of us thinks that wireless
carriers are strict monopolists, and thus the ICE exception is irrelevant. On the other hand, these similarly
situated companies sometimes resemble an oligopoly, with strong incentives to leverage market power into
adjacent markets. Because they face potential competition on price, speed, and device exclusivity, they are
motivated to increase switching costs and customer lock-in. I am puzzled by Nachbar's assertion that
"carriers are selling a commodified, undifferentiated service (carriage)"(p. 83), given the ample evidence
that carriers are in fact differentiating between content, and Nachbar's own claim that in IP carriers are
motivated to differentiate in a way that they were not in the circuit-switched environment. Nachbar then
claims that any market power being exercised is likely coming from the device manufacturers instead,
citing the iPhone-AT&T tie-up and the fact that the iPhone has lured many customers to AT&T. Of course,
one might just as easily conclude that it was precisely the distorted wireless carrier market that motivated
Apple to strike the exclusive deal. In any event, despite the perennial appearance of blockbuster devices,
the device market is far more diverse and competitive than the carrier market. Furthermore, the device
market continues to move toward open platforms of its own accord, with device juggernaut Nokia
announcing the open-sourcing of its operating system on the eve of the launch of Google's own free and
open source "Android" mobile operating system: "Nokia to Acquire Symbian Limited to Enable Evolution
of the Leading Open Mobile Platform," press release 24 June 2008
share similar incentives to discriminate against content and that there is no competitor
that offers comparable non-discriminatory service. AT&T recently stated explicitly that
its wireless network does not respect network non-discrimination and that its terms of
service - "which are similar to those of other wireless providers" - categorically prohibit
all peer-to-peer use.210
Ultimately, Nachbar's critique of the 700 MHz "openness" rules focuses almost
entirely on competition-based analysis of the rules (which, even on its own terms, I
consider to be deeply misguided). Missing from his analysis is any consideration of
whether the 700 MHz use-neutrality rules map to historical non-discrimination norms.
This is odd, considering his masterful exposition of these norms earlier in his paper.
Ultimately, the non-discriminatory considerations in the wireless space are parallel to the
network neutrality debate overall, and conclusions here are essential the same. As with
wireline, wireless operators face genuine network congestion challenges. Content and
application-based discrimination is one way of dealing with these challenges. There are
many other approaches, including discrimination that is not content or application-
based, 2 11 that do not present so directly a threat to free speech, innovation, and
established norms.
<http://www.nokia.com/A4136001?newsid=1230415>; "Industry Leaders Announce Open Platform for
Mobile Devices," press release 5 Nov. 2007 <http://www.openhandsetalliance.com/press_ 110507.html>.
Furthermore, it is hard to imagine any leveraging from devices into the network as general-purpose
computers increasingly become one of the key devices using wireless internet. Despite such developments,
if carriers insist on discriminatory practices, the same bottleneck to innovation remains: use neutrality of
government-granted spectrum. Critics of non-discrimination mandates on wireless spectrum raise myriad
concerns that such requirements restrict possible business plans. They undoubtedly do. The relevant
question is whether or not this benefits or harms overall innovation, growth, and public interest.
210 Letter from Robert W. Quinn, AT&T counsel, WT Docket No. 06-150 (25 July 25 2008).
211 Geoffrey Goodell, Allan Friedman, and Scott Bradner, "Scarcity, Discrimination, and Transparency:
Understanding Network Management," paper to TPRC 2008 Conference, 27 Sept. 2008, pending.
3. TV "White Spaces"
In contrast to the property-oriented approach of auctions, the FCC is considering
an unlicensed approach for another portion of the spectrum previously devoted
exclusively to television broadcasting. 21 2 Although many frequencies below 700 MHz
will still be reserved primarily for digital television broadcast, many of the channels will
be unused in most parts of the country. New "agile" radio technologies can sense which
frequencies are not in use and transmit on only those channels. Many people are hopeful
that such technologies could allow next-generation broadband devices to achieve far
greater geographic coverage and performance than WiFi. The auctioned property
approach might make little sense in an environment in which usage rights depend on
opportunistic sharing with primary "owners." Unlicensed access, on the other hand,
could make the most of any particular local spectrum availability without complicated
licensing and transaction costs.
There are two primary factions in the white spaces debate. The first group, made
up largely of public interest groups and electronics manufacturers, advocates for
unlicensed use. 213 The second group is the incumbent users of the spectrum - TV
broadcasters and wireless microphone users.21 4 Nobody denies that a great deal of
spectrum is going unused, but the incumbent users fear the interference that might be
caused when unlicensed devices malfunction or bleed signals from adjacent channels.
212 In the Matter of Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, etc. Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
FCC Document 04-113.
213 These include organizations like the New America Foundation and trade alliances like the Wireless
Innovation Alliance.
214 These include broadcaster trade organizations like Maximum Service TV (MSTV) and the Microphone
Interests Coalition.
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The technical debate is vast,2 15 and the FCC recently conducted several rounds of real-
world tests of prototype devices. Some have suggested that the Commission should
protect incumbents by licensing white spaces (despite the spectrum's indeterminate
nature), requiring only "fixed" (non-mobile) use, or both.
The wireless microphone issues are especially politically and technologically
complicated. Only a few types of organizations are technically permitted to operate
microphones in the TV bands (and only after obtaining a license), but the FCC has long
looked the other way as microphone manufacturers sell systems to unlicensed and legally
unlicensable entities. Among these technically illegal groups are live performance
venues and houses of worship. As the Commission ponders shifting non-broadcast TV
band use to more efficient technologies, it is left with the dilemma that it has been
complicit in creating a large and expensive installed base of illegal users who desperately
do not want to give up their systems. Indeed, Broadway and a coalition of large churches
have directly lobbied the FCC on the issue, despite the fact that they are technically radio
pirates. 216 On August 21, 2008, in response to a petition by public interest organization
Media Access Project, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the
matter, and solicited comments. 217
215 See, for example, the many technical comments in Docket No. WT 04-186..
216 White-space device developer Michael Marcus recently remarked, "Men of God are violating the law...
but if someone were to walk into a church next Sunday and grab the mike out of the minister's hands and
handcuff him, that wouldn't be reasonable. ... If the Lord Eternal could look down and see everything
simultaneously, what he would see from heaven is that over most of the U.S. over most of the week, the
white space isn't being used" (qtd. in Mallika Rao, "Race for 'White Space' Pits Churches vs. Techies,"
Religous News Service [21 Aug. 2008]
http://www.religionnews.com/index.php?/rnstext/race for white space pits churches vs techies/).
217 In the Matter of Revisions to Rules Authorizing the Operation of Low Power Auxiliary Stations in the
698-806 MHz Band (WT Docket No. 08-166), Public Interest Spectrum Coalition, Petition for Rulemaking
Regarding Low Power Auxiliary Stations, Including Wireless Microphones, and the Digital Television
Transition (WT Docket No. 08-167), Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 08-188 (rel. 21 Aug. 2008)
<http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-188A1.pdf>.
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On a larger scale, the technical points are moot. It is clear that technologies will
indeed enable "agile" use of spectrum and that any current practical issues will be
solvable in the not-too-distant future. The more fundamental question is whether or not
the FCC should devote the spectrum to decentralized use or instead delegate control to a
few large entities. The unlicensed approach is closer to the "commons" model, and the
delegated control model is closer to the "property" model. In reality, the Commission
will likely define usage rules that exert some level of control that is not purely of one
model or the other. When writing these rules, I believe that the Commission should value
decisions that allow an abundance of users and uses.
An unlicensed approach to white spaces would enable immediate use of the
airwaves by a diversity of users. These users would not have to wait for a centralized
owner to build out facilities in their area, nor would they have to pay someone for the
right to use the frequencies. Such an approach would be fundamentally non-
discriminatory. It would not preclude business models premised on offering access to the
internet because such business would have equal access to the frequencies. However, the
unlicensed approach would risk a "crisis of the commons" in which frequencies could
become overused and thus benefit no one. In order for the white spaces to remain usable
in the long run, equipment manufacturers would have to continue to innovate their
interference avoidance mechanisms.
Fortunately, the innovation necessary for ongoing improvement of spectral
efficiency would likely be catalyzed by an unlicensed approach. Unlicensed use allows
for an abundance of use. This freedom would incentivize device manufacturers to find
new ways of putting the frequencies to use. Not only would they be motivated to find
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effective means of sharing the spectrum, such as dynamically adjusting power based on
other users within range, but they would also invent devices that made unanticipated use
of the frequencies. An unlicensed approach would not mandate that the spectrum be used
for web access any more than it might be used for automatic reporting of gas meters.
The unlicensed approach does require minimal coordination on standards - either
voluntarily or at the hand of the FCC. This is perhaps the most difficult area to get right.
There has already been extensive discussion about how to adequately protect incumbent
users. There has been less discussion about what rules, if any, would be needed to
prevent a crisis of the commons amongst shared users. It would be a fatal error were the
Commission to mandate specific, detailed rules in this area.2 18 It would likely be more
workable to require cooperation by some means but to leave the decisions to engineers on
the ground. This approach has worked in the WiFi spectrum blocks.
From the perspective of the Spectrum Policy Task Force (SPTF)
recommendations, the white spaces are a prime candidate for unlicensed use. Although it
falls below the 5 GHz line, at which the SPTF suggested a default to property-like
allocation, its unpredictable nature makes it difficult to propertize. Moreover, the areas in
which the most white space spectrum is available - non-metropolitan areas - are also the
areas least likely to be built out by traditional profit-motivated businesses. The white
spaces represent an opportunity to substantially boost the meager unlicensed allocations
that have taken place since the SPTF first recommended a balanced approach.
In Coase's original article, he argued, "there is no reason why users of radio
frequencies should not be in the same position as other businessmen." 219 His
218 For example, by mandating the IEEE 802.16 or 802.22 standards (fixed or mobile).
219 Coase 30.
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assumption was clear: the only relevant parties in spectrum allocation are businesses,
and the competitive market should select the winners based on their ability to profit
from propertized allocations. The most extreme commons approach offers the
opposite conclusion: non-ownership catalyzes diverse and efficient use. Recent
debates in spectrum policy have made clear that neither approach in its purest form is
ideal, let alone politically viable. Part of this reality stems from public interest
concerns that supersede absolutist approaches. In 700 MHz, it became clear that
although property-like allocation via auction would yield enthusiastic bidding and
build-out, certain non-discriminatory principles could preserve valuable use
neutrality. In the white spaces, the Commission has the opportunity to unleash
innovative use by a diversity of uses, but only if the rules ensure a basic level of
cooperation. In each case, the compromises are motivated by core public interest
considerations.
C. NATIONAL BROADBAND STRATEGY
Network non-discrimination, spectrum allocation, and a host of other issues fall
under the broad category of issues related to the United States' national broadband
strategy. Most commentators believe that more, faster broadband contributes to the
nation's economic and social well-being.2 20 The agreement ends there.
During his 2004 campaign, President Bush set an ambitious goal to achieve
universal broadband by 2007.221 Three years later, few observers thought that this
220 See, for example, Robert D. Atkinson, "Report: The Case for a National Broadband Policy," The
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation 15 June 2007 <http://www.itif.org/index.php?id=52>.
221 Pres. George W. Bush, "Promoting Innovation and Competitiveness: President Bush's Technology
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objective was even close to being achieved. The National Telecommunications
Infrastructure Administration nevertheless released a report in which it stated, "a
reasonable assessment of the available data indicates that the nation has, to a very great
degree, realized this objective." 222 The report was roundly criticized by the Democratic
FCC Commissioners223 and public interest organizations. 224 Among those critiques were
arguments that the United States is behind its international competitors by many
measures and the fact that the FCC's data gathering and reporting mechanisms are
seriously flawed. The political reality has been that the debate has focused on these types
of questions rather than more fundamental discussions of what strategy might catalyze
broadband deployment.
The first meta-debate centers around whether the United States is in fact behind
other nations in broadband deployment. The argument often begins by citing
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) data, in which the
United States ranks fifteenth in terms of subscribers per capita among OECD countries,
Agenda" http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/technology/economic policv200404/chap4.html.
222 United States, Depart. of Commerce, "Networked Nation."
2-3 Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein replied, "With only half of adult Americans participating in the
broadband age and U.S. consumers paying far more than citizens in other countries for less bandwidth, this
report appears to be missing some key chapters. Noticeably absent is any coherent strategy going forward"
("Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein Responds to NTIA Report on Broadband" [31 Jan. 2008])
<http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-279916A1.pdf>) Commissioner Michael J.
Copps stated, "Networked Nation? If the United States were a networked nation consumers would be
paying half as much for broadband connections 20 times as fast. That's what many consumers around the
globe get. Instead, NTIA slices and dices bad data (full disclosure: much of it from the FCC) in ever more
outlandish ways to reach the conclusion that all is well - don't worry, be happy. If we spent more time
developing strategies for truly ubiquitous and affordable broadband rather than watching our international
competitors lap us at every turn, we actually might have something to crow about." ("FCC Commissioner
Michael J. Copps Questions NTIA's Broadband Report" [31 Jan. 2008]
<http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-279906A 1 .pdf>.
224 Free Press, "Ignoring Reality, Bush Declares Broadband Mission Accomplished"
http://www.freepress.net/press/release.php?id=331; Public Knowledge, "Bush Administration Broadband
Report Distorts Reality" http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1377; Benton Foundation, Center for
Creative Voices in the Media, and Florida PIRG, "More than Rhetoric Needed to Close Broadband Gap"
<http://www.benton.org/node/8947>.
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compared to fourth in 2001.225 Others have tried to provide more accurate measures,
which also show dismal trends.226 The inevitable answer to these critiques is that they do
not correctly measure broadband deployment and that if we employ a different method it
will be clear that "we are doing fine.'"227 It is clear that no single measure of broadband
penetration will be authoritative. After all, different measures can inform different policy
decisions. It is nevertheless becoming increasingly hard to find ways to spin the
available data in order to make the case that broadband deployment in the US is robust
and keeping up with ever-growing demand. Such conclusions conflict with the
perceptions of end-users and even the carriers' own claims of network congestion.
Nevertheless, the international ranking debate begets an even more fine-grained
number-crunching debate; whether we are appropriately gathering and characterizing our
domestic deployment data. The FCC requires that broadband providers report where they
are offering service, broken down by area code. If just one subscriber has service in
sometimes-large area codes, the whole area is considered served. However, the
Commission does not even make this level of data available, instead releasing
deployment data only in limited aggregated form. This gives the Commission
tremendous latitude in how it represents the data and has drawn heavy criticism from
those that believe that the FCC is "creatively" propping up the numbers. Moreover, until
recently the Commission defined "broadband" as anything exceeding a meager 256 kbps
225 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "OECD Broadband Statistics to December
2006" 2007 <http://www.oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband>.
226 Robert D. Atkinson, "Framing a National Broadband Policy," CommLaw Conspectus 16 (2007): 145-
177.
227 Scott Wallsten, testimony for FCC en banc hearing on broadband and the digital future, Carnegie
Mellon University, 21 July 2008 <http://www.fcc.gov/broadband_digital future/072108/wallsten.pdf.>
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in the downstream direction (with no consideration at all of the upload speed so critical to
two-way communication). 228
In 2007, the Center for Public Integrity unsuccessfully sued the Commission for
access to the raw data. The FCC and interveners claimed that the data was protected
because its disclosure would likely cause substantial competitive harm.22 9 It is difficult to
understand why data disclosure that would enhance providers' ability to compete should
be protected as a matter of policy, especially by an agency that has come to view greater
competition as fundamental to its mission. Nevertheless, the Court deferred to the
Commission's stated rules, regardless of the fundamental policy effects.
The data gathering debate is even further obfuscated by a series of efforts to
suggest alternate schemes for gathering broadband data. Some of these are clearly well
intentioned projects designed to provide consumers with greater information,230 whereas
others appear to have more mixed motives. In the latter category is the provider-funded
Connected Nation initiative, premised on the idea that the government should support
decentralized efforts to map from the ground-up the data that the providers already report
to the FCC. Along the way, the project would help identify local stakeholders who could
help grease the wheels to deployment. While it is impossible to know the hearts of the
access providers, one can certainly imagine how the Connected Nation approach could
serve as at least a distraction and at best a valuable source of marketing data.
Although questions of international ranking and data gathering are important, on a
grand scheme I believe that bickering at this level has obfuscated the real issues. It is
2:,8 FCC 08-89 (rel. 12 June 2008), as cited earlier.
2:29 Center for Public Integrity v. FCC, 505 F. Supp. 2d 106, 2007.
230 See, for example, <http://broadbandcensus.com/>, which was started by Drew Clark who led the Center
For Public Integrity's failed FCC disclosure suit.
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clear that citizens want more and faster broadband. It is clear that broadband contributes
to economic prosperity and social flourishing. A substantive national broadband strategy
would focus on how to bring true broadband access to all citizens, and it would be
informed by the fact that giving access providers nearly unlimited discretion in the name
of "deregulation" and market forces has not worked. It would further recognize that it is
not good policy to sacrifice non-discrimination principles in the process. If citizens end
up with access only to a fragmented version of the internet, on which they can only
access content or applications of the provider's choosing, they will not have accessed the
internet at all.
This is not the first time the nation has faced the difficulty of nationwide build-out
of core infrastructure. Electrification, the national highway system, and the telephone
network all posed similar issues and called for varying policy interventions. What they
had in common was a commitment to a unified network and a strong national vision. We
need such a vision for broadband.
III. BROADBAND AND THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
We stand at a crossroads in media policy. On the one hand, we can surrender
communications policy completely to competition policy. Down this path lies great
uncertainty. What constitutes fair competition? How do we define the markets? What
ensures welfare-enhancing access to users and uses of the network? On the other hand,
we can incorporate public interest principles that have guided communications policy for
decades, while being mindful of market incentives. This path does not provide us with
the quantitative comfort of economic equations. However, it does not lull us into the
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perception that what we value in communications is always strictly quantifiable. After
all, "the public interest" has remained flexible for a reason - media change.
This is not to say that regulation in the public interest has always been well
considered or effective. Broadcast regulation has been particularly troublesome, and this
difficulty was significantly exacerbated by the highly scarce and one-way nature of the
medium. There are more fruitful sources of public interest principles to be drawn from
the legacy of wireline carriers. In this section, I describe three areas in which legacy
communications policy should be transformed for the network era in light of renewed
public interest considerations.
A. FROM UNIVERSAL SERVICE TO UNIVERSAL ACCESS
The internet ethos of abundance of users is paralleled in the long-held
communications policy of universal service. Policymakers have long considered ways in
which all citizens could be included in the national communications infrastructure. In the
case of the telephone, this meant that policies were created to subsidize build-out of the
network in areas that were not economically attractive. In the case of broadcast, licenses
were considered based on whether or not they allowed signal coverage of and appropriate
content for all communities. The fundamental idea was that the social well-being of the
citizenry depended on being "served" by providers of communications. These social
obligations often ran counter to the short-term economic interests of the service
providers, but were nevertheless considered fundamental to the public interest. In a
sense, such obligations echoed the "holding out" theory of the public interest - if a
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communications business offered service to one group, it took on a public obligation to
serve all.
1. Beyond Service
As our communications media shift from one-way broadcast or gatekeeper-
controlled telecommunications services, our notion of universal service must also evolve.
The notion that the government or an individual firm has the capacity to determine which
service is best for the public is paternalism, hubris, or both. This is where FCC Chairman
Mark Fowler was absolutely correct. There was perhaps a role for this in an environment
of extreme channel scarcity and unsophisticated telecommunications technology.
However, the fact that we have moved beyond that stage does not mean that there is no
role for a holistic social goal of connecting everybody.
The type of connection to be valued in the increasingly two-way and layered
network environment - and to be encouraged through proactive policy - is universal
access. Such a value recognizes that there is overall social benefit to connecting all
members of society, but it does not prescribe what must be done with that connection.
This is true to the historical notions of universality, but less vulnerable to governmental
or industry capture. It treats communications platforms as infrastructure, not as private
transmission channels. It embraces both the principle that all users should be connected
and the principle that once connected they should be free to communicate as they wish.
Despite the clear social and rhetorical value of "connecting all Americans," there
is a clear economic argument for such an approach as well. As I detail elsewhere, the
network effects of adding more nodes to the system benefit all others. No individual can
capture all of these "externalities," and instead they accrue to all users. The collective
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value of an interconnected network of networks far exceeds even the value of similar but
unconnected islands of users. Network effects are, by their nature, difficult to quantify.
Nevertheless, even a casual user of email today can recognize the benefit of being able to
instantly reach nearly any other individual for a fraction of the price of the old network -
the postal system. Such benefits were not possible until most Americans gained access to
email. Similar effects are at work in the case of broadband, but in that case there is still
great disparity.
2. Lessons from the USF
"Universal Service" is a much-reviled doctrine amongst contemporary
communications policy theorists. This position is largely the result of years of
governmental and industry twisting of the doctrine's implementation, as it is embodied in
the Universal Service Fund (USF).23 1 The USF has historically included various
provisions for subsidizing the cost of telephone access for certain users. There are many
lessons to be learned from the history of USF, and I cannot possibly cover them all
here.232 Two fundamental lessons, however, stand out.
First, where subsidization schemes exist they will unfailingly be warped by the
particular politics of the American system. For example, Senators from rural states will
win funding regardless of genuine need. Indeed, as Kearney and Merrill note, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 explicitly identified rural customers independent of
23I See Rob Frieden, "Killing With Kindness: Fatal Flaws in the $ 6.5 Billion Universal Service Funding
Mission and What Should Be Done to Narrow The Digital Divide," Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law
Journal 24 (2006): 447-490.
232 Nuechterlein and Weiser cover several of these shortcomings and lessons in Digital Crossroads 333-
355.
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whether or not access was "high-cost" (and the FCC has followed this guidance). 233 This
is a political reality unlikely to disappear soon.
Second, incumbents will manipulate the system to avoid the costs for their next-
generation systems while systematically applying them to less politically powerful
entities. This reality has played out in the Voice-over-IP (VoIP) arena, in which carriers
have successfully lobbied for schemes that apply universal service fees to internet-based
VolP providers while avoiding any such fees on their own broadband offerings.234 In
fact, these contributions into the fund are ironically paid out to the incumbent providers
themselves. Perversely, the effect is that the FCC turned the fund that traditionally cross-
subsidized infrastructure development into a means for extracting more funds from
application developers. Pay-outs of USF funds have continued to be telephony-centric,
meaning that the only way they support internet access is in the outmoded dial-up
arena.235
In 2007, the FCC Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service released
recommendations that suggested various fundamental reforms to the USF, including a
new "Broadband Fund."23 6 On May 1, 2008, the Commission voted to implement only
one of the many recommendations in the report, deferring any action on the Broadband
Fund recommendation for another time.237 This action was not encouraging for
233 Kearney and Merrill 1346.
234 In the Matter of Universal Service Contribution Methodology, etc. Report And Order And Notice Of
Proposed Rulemaking,. FCC Document 06-94 (rel. 27 June 2006).
235 At least, it only explicitly and directly supported dial-up access. In the case of DSL, there is no way to
separate subsidization of traditional phone service and subsidization of broadband service because they use
the same infrastructure.
236 Recommended Decision, FCC Document 07J-4 (rel. 20 Nov. 2007)
<http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/FCC-07J-4A I.pdf>.
237 In the Matter of Universal Service Contribution Methodology, etc. Order, FCC Document 08-122 (rel. 1
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advocates of fundamental USF reform, but time will tell whether or not the FCC finds a
more sensible way of updating the rules. Creating the optimal balance is a difficult and
perhaps even impossible task. Susan Crawford has argued that subsidization should
instead come from the general treasury.238 This and many other solutions may help to
modernize the USF. Apart from the discussion of this particular program, however, we
can incorporate the principles of universal service - and, more appropriately, access -
into current policy decisions before the Commission and Congress.
3. A Ubiquitous and Unitary Network
Kevin Werbach steps up a level from the detailed Universal Service Fund debates
in order to identify two critical principles of universal service policy. 2 39 These two
historically valued aspects of the communications network are that it be ubiquitous and
that it be unitary, i. e., affect policy decisions much more broadly than narrow USF
ftnding questions. They resonate with the internet ethos of abundant use and users.
Werbach explains that "Subsidy mechanisms to enhance ubiquity should be linked to
obligations to preserve the unitary nature of the Internet. Similarly, growing government
engagement in promoting universal broadband connectivity should facilitate a transition
away from legacy universal service programs that no longer serve public interest
goals." 240
The goal of broadband ubiquity is consistent with contemporary notions of
universal service, emphasizing the need for affordable access for all citizens. This is the
May 2008) <http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-122A1.pdf>.
238 Crawford n. 147.
239 Werbach,"Connections."
240 Werbach, "Connections" 2.
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factor at issue when policymakers and pundits debate America's relative ranking abroad
when it comes to broadband deployment. It is the principle motivating comments to the
effect that as a nation we should make sure that nobody is left behind, or that we need to
be concerned with a "digital divide" in broadband. 24' It is the reason we currently
subsidize broadband access for schools and libraries. It is the focus of much of the
rhetoric around a "national broadband strategy" that I outlined earlier. There is a reason
that this value is emphasized - ubiquitous access is clearly socially beneficial. However,
even though ubiquity is unanimously advocated there is remarkably little concrete action.
While USF reform might make up part of the solution, the goal of ubiquitous access
should inform other areas such as unlicensed spectrum access, municipal broadband, and
auction rules.
The other historically valued aspect of communications networks, the notion that
they should be unitary, goes back to the early days of the telephone. As Werbach
explains, AT&T CEO Theodore Vail argued that in order to provide access to everyone,
the country should have only one telephone system. Thus, someone placing a call on the
network could be sure to reach any other person on the network. As some level
competition replaced the AT&T monopoly toward the latter half of the twentieth century,
and standards and interconnection mandates replaced the one-company approach to a
unitary network. Nevertheless, the core value and its effect were preserved -
communications on the network were communications on the network. The internet, as a
network-of-networks, displays this characteristic in stark contrast to its now-defunct
private-island competitors like CompuServe, Prodigy, and AOL. In terms of
24 'See, for example,. Lennard G. Kruger and Angele A. Gilroy, Congressional Research Service,
Broadband Internet Access and the Digital Divide, Order Code RL30719 (Updated 4 June 2008)
<http://opencrs.com/getfile.php?rid=60939>.
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contemporary debates, the unitary network relies on shared standards, open
interconnection, and non-discrimination. As soon as one sub-network chooses to prevent
particular users or uses, the unitary network becomes fragmented.
The twin goals of a ubiquitous and unitary network can certainly be justified on
economic grounds, but it is important to recognize that they also have fundamental social
bases. In the context of the internet, it is all the more important for users to be able to
freely communicate as they wish with their access to that network, rather than being
restricted to pre-defined services. Such flexibility leads not just to economic growth
(which I discuss in the next section), but also to historically rooted social benefit.
B. FROM ANTITRUST TO INNOVATION 242
Ever since the earliest articulations of the "public interest," there has been an
emphasis on fostering competition. The market-focused competition line of reasoning is
one key component to communications policy. Ultimately, policymakers should be
concerned with how well economic policy contributes to overall growth. In this section I
consider the extent to which modern antitrust incorporates the economic realities of the
broadband economy, with the substantial caveat that even if antitrust analysis were
exhaustive in the economic sense it would nevertheless be incomplete in terms of broader
public interest concerns.
In the United States, competition law derives primarily from antitrust statutes
instituted around the turn of the century in the Sherman and Clayton Acts. While these
statutes and their further development through court precedent address many situations,
242 Some portions of this section are adapted from Whitt and Schultze.
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antitrust is stretched when it comes to complex network economies like the internet.
While many have observed that the "new economy" does not necessarily change the
fundamental rules of economics, 243 it is another question altogether whether antitrust is
up to the task. A great deal of ink has been spilled on "antitrust modernization"
efforts, 244 and antitrust analysis has evolved along with industry changes. Undoubtedly,
antitrust enforcers are more aware than ever of the "dynamic" nature of innovation-
centric markets. Commentators are split as to whether or not simultaneous competition
or temporary monopoly generates the greatest amount of innovation in a particular
market.245 More fundamentally, there is scarce awareness at the antitrust agency level of
how conduct at the platform layer of a multi-sided economy can affect overall innovation
in the markets that rely on that platform. Even "modernized" antitrust fails to understand
the unique competitive features of such platform economies - much less the ways in
which innovation is fostered or stifled in this environment. 246 Finally, any activity that
243 For example, economist Hal Varian has noted that, "there are some forces that are particularly important
in high-tech. . . . [T]hese forces are not 'new'; indeed the forces at work in network industries in the 1990s
are very similar to those that confronted the telephone and wireless industries in the 1890s" (
Hal Varian, Joseph Farrell, et al., The Economics oflnformation Technology:. An Introduction (Cambridge,
MA: Cambridge UP, 2004) 3.
244 Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations (2007)
<http://www.amc .gov/report-recommendation/amc-final report.pdf>.
245 Jonathan B. Baker, "Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation," American
Antitrust Institute Working Paper no. 07-04 (Feb. 2008) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=11 03623>.
246 My critique here is two-fold: 1) modern antitrust agencies do not understand multi-sided markets even in
terms of traditional "competition" considerations, and 2) modern antitrust agencies do not understand how
the more dynamic innovation operates in a platform market. There is some recent literature on the
former;see, e.g., Dale S. Evans, "The Antitrust Economics of Multi-sided Platform Markets," Yale Journal
on Regulation 20.2 (Summer 2003): 325-381. However, even these nascent and highly contested analyses
do not address the second part of my critique. In short, some scholars have begun to understand how
competition in multi-sided markets functions, and antitrust agencies have begun to incorporate innovation
theory in traditional one-sided market analysis, but few have tried to put them together. Philip J. Weiser is
an exception, performing such analysis primarily in the roughly parallel domain of intellectual property
("The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy," Columbia Law Review 103.3 [Apr. 2003]:
534-613). Some recent antitrust cases, such as Microsoft, begin to touch upon these considerations. There
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does not fall within the Sherman Act's narrow view of firm-to-firm conduct - such as
non-profit or peer-to-peer innovation - is outside the purview of antitrust altogether.
Antitrust is a focused tool, or at best a toolbox, for specific, tactical interventions.
Economics-based public interest justifications must look beyond antitrust's ever-
narrowing Sherman Act §2 "monopolization" arguments to incorporate richer platform
innovation analysis.
1. The Invisible Gland
Adam Smith's foundational 1776 work, The Wealth of Nations, theorized that as a
firm developed specialized roles for workers, their skills would benefit the productivity
of the firm and thus the market overall. The cost of goods they produced would be
disciplined by the "invisible hand" of competitive pricing, and the market would
converge on an optimally efficient equilibrium. 247 In the early twentieth century,
economist Joseph Schumpeter modified this competitive hypothesis, pointing out that
firms often formed temporary monopolies and were subsequently unseated by other firms
through an act he called "creative destruction." The critical advantage of these winning
new entrants was their improved technology. Through this process, innovation occurred
in a stair-step fashion rather than a continuous line.2 48
Much of economic growth theory has focused on how best to encourage
development of these technologies. Nobel Prize winning economist Robert Solow
is, however, no mention of such platform or multi-sided market considerations anywhere in the Antitrust
Modernization Commission report. In any event, there is little consensus among scholars, and let alone
antitrust enforcers, as to how to consider such factors.
247 Adam Smith, The Wealth ofNations (1776). Interestingly, Smith's famous "invisible hand" can be
reinterpreted as an emergent behavior of the capitalist system.
248 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, (3rd ed. (New York: Harper,1950).
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recently observed that Schumpeter
worked out his conception of the entrepreneur, the maker of "new
combinations," as the driving force and characteristic figure of the fits-
and-starts evolution of the capitalist economy. He was explicit that, while
technological innovation was in the long run the most important function
of the entrepreneur, organizational innovation in governance, finance, and
management was comparable in significance. . . . I think that this is
Schumpeter's main legacy to economics: the role of technological and
organizational innovation in driving and shaping the growth trajectory of
capitalist economies.2 49
Solow's own work on growth theory in the 1950's was highly influential, but
ultimately failed to fully explain the stair-step pattern of technological progress that
Shumpeter described. In Solow's growth model, technology fed into the system at a
steady rate. When it came to explaining what generated this innovation, however, the
Solow model was at a loss, because it treated this technological advance as something
that happened exogenously, coming from outside the economy itself. To be sure,
technology had assumed a place of importance, but the core question of how to
encourage technology and the resulting growth remained unanswered.
2. Endogenous Growth
Schumpeter's core claims about how technological change happens would lay
249 Robert Solow, "Heavy Thinker," review of Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative
Destruction, The New Republic, 21 May 21 2007: 48-50.
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somewhat dormant until the 1980s. By the end of the decade, the younger generation of
economists was hard at work on the "increasing returns" problem. In short, they asked,
"Why do some economies appear to grow very rapidly, despite the fact that all of the
traditional inputs are simply increasing at a steady rate?"
Exogenous factors are background conditions and givens that lie outside an
economic model. In traditional economic theory, factors of production are land, labor,
and capital. Knowledge and human nature were simply "givens," a fixed part of the
background. Young economist Paul M. Romer concluded instead that technological
change and the growth of knowledge (the results of ideas) should be viewed as
endogenous to the system - produced by it and affected by changes in the economy itself.
Furhtermore, he noted ideas can be copied and adapted in ways that people or things
cannot. In economic terms, ideas are "non-rival." 250 To Romer, ideas are what truly
matter in generating economic growth.
Romer accepted fellow economist Kenneth Arrow's observation that "information
is not only the product of inventive activity, it is also an input," 251 creating a positive
feedback effect of technological progress.2 52 At the same time, he noted Schumpeter's
point that firms can be spurred to innovate in order to gain or retain their market power.
But he also altered these basic ideas in critical ways. Arrow's feedback loop of
technological knowledge became not simply learning-by-doing within firms, but rather a
250 Paul Romer, "Endogenous Technological Change," The Journal of Political Economy 98.5 Part 2
(October 1990): S71-S102. Romer was not the first to observe this non-rivalrous property of ideas, but by
applying it in this context he helped unlock the mystery of knowledge-fueled growth.
251 Kenneth J. Arrow, "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," in The Rate and
Direction of Inventive Activity, ed. Richard R. Nelson (Princeton, NJ, Princeton UP, 1962) 618.
252 Romer.
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global multiplier of productivity when this non-rival information resource was shared.
Ideas, Romer explained, cannot be over-used. Schumpeter's "creative destruction"
would happen, according to Romer, in situations where monopoly was neither complete
nor highly difficult to overcome. 253
3. Anti-Antitrust
So, what does this all mean for the role of antitrust when it comes to broadband?
Antitrust faces myriad limitations in accurately describing the internet economy. Merger
reviews rely on market-share analysis that is a poor proxy for multi-sided market power.
The antitrust adjudication process assumes that parties have the resources and know-how
to bring complaints. Competition analysis falls apart when one tries to assess would-be
or non-profit competitors. Monopoly power is less relevant when one considers similarly
motivated oligopolists. Vertical leveraging matters little if the discriminating firm is not
trying to enter the adjacent market. Network effects introduce indirect incentives that are
hard to account for. 254 It is an odd notion that we entrust oversight of one of the most
253 Thus, monopolies are not categorically beneficial to innovation, as some extreme Schumpeterians claim.
As Carl Shapiro has noted, "The harder questions arise when we seek to assess the durability of monopoly
power in dynamic industries. The obvious starting point is to ask how long the firm has enjoyed a
dominant position using some measure of market share. While a firm that has long captured a dominant
share of the market might lose share rapidly, some good reason needs to be provided why this is likely to be
the case. [. . .] As a rule of thumb, a reasonable working hypothesis is that a firm with a very large market
share that has persisted for several years or more in a market with relatively stable contours has durable
monopoly power" ("Antitrust, Innovation, and Intellectual Property," testimony to Antitrust Modernization
Commission, 8 Nov. 2005, 4)
<http ://govinfo. library.unt.edu/amc/commission hearings/pdf/StatementShap iro.pdf>.
254 Philip J. Weiser notes, "Given the importance of building and maintaining a large mass of users on a
given network, firms will face conflicting incentives as to how to manage product compatibility and
interoperability between networks. On one hand, inter-firm cooperation will spur a more valuable network;
on the other hand a firm stands to gain huge economic rents (i.e., profits) by maintaining proprietary
control over a network. To do so, however, a firm will either need to maintain intellectual property
protection over key technologies, ensure that the relevant contracts preclude compatibility, or to
strategically prevent others from undermining its network standard. The challenge for antitrust courts is to
determine the nature of a firm's conduct in cases where it may well defy easy or quick categorization"
("The Relationship of Antitrust and Regulation," 6). Indeed, I think that this "challenge for antitrust
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significant industries, which also serves as a core channel of democratic discourse, to a
doctrine ill-suited for these complex considerations.
The strongest argument in favor of an antitrust-like approach comes from Phil
Weiser.255 He claims that regulators should consider only competitive or consumer
protection harms, and that it should only do so in ex post adjudication (not before-the-fact
rulemakings). These two aspects of his approach are distinct, although it is at times
difficult to distinguish between them in his arguments. It is also difficult to envision
which enforcement agency or statute specifically he expects will carry the weight. He
appears to envision a "more perfect" version of both the FCC and the Federal Trade
Commission. He seems to hold that the FTC should only have a role with respect to
consumer protection (Section 5 of the Sherman Act), and that the FCC should undertake
competition oversight.
The FTC-based consumer protection that Weiser envisions would involve more
disclosure by providers regarding their traffic blocking or discrimination, and agency
oversight to make sure that they are doing what they promise. There seems to be little
reason to dispute the notion that this would lead to more informed consumers that would
better be able to make wiser market decisions. However, in addition to these disclosure
requirements, Weiser proposes that the agency mandate a minimal, non-discriminatory,
best-efforts level of broadband access. The FTC has established its authority under §5 to
mandate disclosure and transparency, but something akin to a best-efforts service
courts" can easily become a brick wall. There is no reason to believe that such courts will substantially
improve their ability to adjudicate cases, especially in the context of the many exacerbating factors I have
outlined.
255 Philip J. Weiser, "The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality," Administrative Law Review 60.2 (2008),
pending.
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mandate appears to be entirely unprecedented. Indeed, in his short description of this
proposal, he provides no basis for such authority. Furthermore, he essentially delegates
the industry-specific task of determining what constitutes adequate characteristics of
minimal "broadband" to the general purpose FTC. The most likely outcome appears to
be that the FTC simple does not attempt to adopt such a standard either because it does
not have the authority or because it does not have the domain expertise. Weiser seems to
anticipate this outcome, noting that, If the FTC chooses not to insist on a level of
continuing best efforts delivery, it should pay close attention to a broadband provider's
disclosures. .. 256
Weiser's competition policy amounts to asking the FCC to perform case-by-case
adjudication of providers' conduct, according to general competition considerations. He
proposes that any discriminatory practice should be assumed to be anticompetitive by
default, but that providers should be allowed to show otherwise. He appears to believe
that the FCC should take some heed from FTC or DOJ precedent, but it is unclear what
principles in particular should guide FCC competition considerations. He notes that there
is little consensus amongst scholars and policy makers with respect to the competitive
effects of conduct by platform gatekeepers. It seems that the facts in ex post adjudication
would likely be subject to intense debate. Furthermore, the agency weighing the merits
would be operating without the statutory or doctrinal support of formal antitrust.
Weiser has essentially swapped the traditional roles of general antitrust agencies
and the industry-specific FCC. His "best-efforts" internet access is a weakened version
of traditional non-discriminatory safeguards, re-framed as an exclusively economic
256 Weiser, Next Frontier 26.
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argument. The disclosure obligations that he places in the hands of the FTC are already
being implemented in part by the FCC in the Comcast dispute. His FCC-run competition
policy relies on antitrust-like principles - both in its competitive considerations and its ex
post nature - but places responsibility in the hands of an institution with less knowledge
and a less clear mandate. The net effect may simply be overall reticence to act.
Network economies such as broadband are complex adaptive systems that defy
traditional antitrust definitions. 2 57 Verizon v. Trinko arguably removed
telecommunications from the purview of antitrust, but for the wrong reason. It is not
clear that regulatory agencies are any better at assessing narrowly conceived
anticompetitive conduct than the antitrust agencies - indeed they are probably worse.
However, regulatory agencies do tend to take a more holistic view of markets and social
considerations than the antitrust agencies. This may make for better or worse policy
depending on the competence of the agency. For antitrust to remain relevant in
broadband policy - whether it is enforced via the antitrust agencies or regulatory agencies
-- it must consider the multi-sided, dynamic, platform-oriented nature of the broadband
market. This calls for network-aware policymaking. 258 It may well be that regulatory
agencies that consider the broad nature of the market are better situated to assess and
control the deleterious economic effects of gatekeeper conduct than are the specific
antitrust agencies.
257 1 explore this in detail in Whitt and Schultze.
258 See, e.g., Economides.
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C. FROM CONTROLLED USE TO GENERAL PURPOSE2 59
The internet is different. It is different from earlier media because it is
fundamentally a many-to-many platform with low barriers to entry and global reach. It is
also potentially more flexible than its predecessors, encompassing and extending their
features. However, although this flexible nature lends to its exceptional characteristics, it
also makes it similar to earlier technologies. Many of these earlier innovations have
similarly been open to diverse uses and follow-on innovations. Economists call them
"General Purpose Technologies" and internet scholar Jonathan Zittrain refers to this
feature as "generativity." Like motors or electricity, the internet spurs economy-wide
growth. Like the printing press or the signal processing, the internet facilitates society-
wide communication. To realize the full potential of the internet, we need
communications policy that catalyzes diverse use and guards against attempts to lock it
down. Whether we are successful will ultimately determine whether the network serves
as public interest infrastructure or just another special purpose channel.
1. General Purpose Technologies
A General Purpose Technology (GPT) is a special type of technology that has
broad-ranging enabling effects across many sectors of the economy. The foundational
work on GPTs was first published by Timothy Bresnahan and Manuel Trajtenberg in
1992.60 In line with Arrow and Romer, they describe how this particular type of
technology is most likely to generate increasing returns and that this growth comes from
259 Some portions of this section are adapted from Whitt and Schultze.
260 Timothy Bresnahan and Manuel Trajtenberg, "General Purpose Technologies 'Engines of Growth'?"
(1992), reprinted in Journal of Econometrics 65 (1995): 83.
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specific applications that depend on ideas in the "general" layer of technology.
Specifically, GPTs play a role of "enabling technologies" by opening up new
opportunities rather than offering complete, final solutions. 26' The result is "innovational
complementarities,"; "the productivity of R&D in a downstream sector increases as a
consequence of innovation in the GPT technology. These complementarities magnify the
effects of innovation in the GPT, and help propagate them throughout the economy."262
Since 1992, economists have expanded upon how electricity, motors, personal
computers, and software platforms all exhibit this characteristic. 263 The Internet in
particular is a GPT, with "the potential to contribute disproportionately to economic
growth" because it generates value "as inputs into a wide variety of productive activities
engaged in by users."2'' 6 4 Whereas Romer focused generally on the economy overall, the
GPT literature makes clear that some technologies are especially important when it
comes to non-rival reuse and follow-on innovation.
One lesson for policymakers is that when considering the appropriate balance
between static incentives and dynamic openness, one must also consider the extent to
which a particular type of technology is a GPT. Looking back at the development of the
IT industry more than ten years after his key GPT paper, Bresnahan commented,
The most economically important use of a general purpose technology need
not be determined by the inventors of the GPT, but rather by the inventors of
complements, applications. But let us be clear that the lesson here for
261 Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 84.
262 Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 84.
263 See, e.g., Elhanan Helpman, General Purpose Technologies And Economic Growth (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1998).
264 Frischmann and van Schewick 424, 398.
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Schumpeterian Economics is far more general than the narrow and specific
point about "open architecture," which seems like a technical concept from
computing. Instead, the point is about the role of a permissive, forward-
looking system of innovation in which inventions can come from multiple
sources.2 5
Keeping a GPT "general" is not always in the clear interest of firms that might
seek to control them. A firm might envision greater profits through making the
tremendously useful resource more scarce, or by charging much higher than marginal
cost. The same firm might also think that the GPT could be far more efficient if it
were customized solely for a particular application. 266 While these perceptions might
be true in the short term, or for a particular firm's profits, it can have devastating
effects for growth of the economy overall. The more general purpose the technology,
the greater are the growth-dampening effects if it becomes locked down in the interest
of a particular economic agent.
2. Generativity
Jonathan L. Zittrain calls the internet a "generative technology," meaning that it
has great "capacity for leverage across a range of tasks, adaptability to a range of
different tasks, ease of mastery, and accessibility."' 27 The important feature of generative
265 Timothy Bresnahan, "Creative Destruction in the PC Industry," in Perspectives on Innovation, ed.
Franco Malerba and Stefano Brusoni (New York: Cambridge UP, 2007) 105-140: 118.
266 This is not to say that firms cannot create specialized implementations of GPTs. On the contrary, much
of the value of GPTs comes from specific instantiations. Nobody would think of bringing a desktop
computer along on a plane in order to work en route, but most laptop computers are not fundamentally
different with respect to their general-purpose nature than desktops. If, however, a firm obtained and
exercised control over the fundamental PC, operating system, or network platforms, it would foreclose
welfare-enhancing specialization.
267 Zittrain, "The Generative Internet."
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systems such as the Internet is that users can easily do numerous things with them, many
of which may not have been envisioned by the designers. If, for example, the Internet
had been built solely as a platform for sending email and required retooling to do
anything else, most applications and business models never would have developed.
Zittrain notes that these uses span not only the economically beneficial, but also many
social and collaborative applications like Wikipedia. 268 That being said, on Wikipedia
and elsewhere on the internet, scammers, spammers, and no-goodniks often take
advantage of this freedom and spoil it for the rest of us.
The critical question, from the generative perspective, is how to allow for
productive behavior while discouraging counter-productive behavior. This is a very
different question than whether or not such use is worth preserving at all. It allows us to
consider whether preserving productive generativity requires us to mandate that owners
of the network infrastructure permit future inventions even when those inventions may be
a new virus or movie-pirating application. It could seem intuitive that if a particular type
of web site is prone to malware attacks, or if a particular protocol is primarily used for
piracy, we should simply block it altogether. It would seem logical that we should extend
gatekeepers' ability to peer into the traffic that is passing over their networks in order to
block the bad stuff. It might even make sense for us to mandate that for new broadband
spectrum, operators should only allow what they can positively identify as family
friendly. 269 Totalitarian regimes might seek to cleanse the network of all criticism.
268 See, e.g., Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It (New Haven, CN: Yale UP,
2008) 151.
269 Indeed, this is precisely what the FCC recently proposed for an upcoming auction. See In the Matter of
Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 2155-2175 MHz Band, Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking,FCC Document 08-158, WT Docket No. 07-195 (rel. 20 June 2008).
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Zittrain's proposal is that rather than slowly allowing the network to become more
centrally controlled and narrowly defined, we should use generativity to fight generativity
- in order to preserve generativity.
This might sound non-intuitive, if not logically invalid, but it is entirely consistent
with the exceptional development of the internet. Absent a specific mandated use or
centralized control, the internet ethos begat means of self-governance - albeit on top of a
regulated non-discriminatory transport architecture. 270 Generativity reminds us that there
are in-between spaces and solutions, and that one important criteria for considering these
solutions is not just whether they will solve today's problems, but whether they will leave
open the possibility of unexpected innovation in the future.
3. Emergence
In the presence of network effects, General Purpose Technologies, and
generativity, policymakers need to appreciate that they cannot engineer the public interest
uses of broadband. They should also understand that the companies that are in the
business of broadband cannot predict who or what will be the most beneficial to society.
This is not to say that there is no role whatsoever for government - far from it. Instead,
the government can provide critical safeguards with the goal of supporting the
unanticipated.
The internet has formed from the bottom up. Simple protocols and rules of
interconnection allowed diverse devices and networks to join together organically. The
modular structure of the protocols allowed decentralized innovation at each layer. Use
270 See my earlier description of the combined effect of the Computer Inquiries, Carterphone, and common
carriage.
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neutrality allowed anyone to create new applications or express themselves freely.
Researchers in both biology and economics have begun to examine this type of
productive non-coordinated behavior under the general framework of "emergence."
Emergent systems are often described as being "organism-like" in the sense that
they are constantly growing and adapting. Each agent follows localized rules and
motivations, but the end result is additive and interdependent. When agents interact
through networks, they evolve their ways of doing work and discover new techniques.
Out of this combined activity, a spontaneous structure emerges. Without any centralized
control, emergent properties take shape based on agent relationships and the conditions in
the overall environment. 271 These characteristics appear in many human systems. James
Odell notes that "with the stock market, thousands of agents act independently to buy and
sell shares of particular stocks and bonds. Yet from this independent behavior, an
organism-like product called the stock market emerges." 2 72 Much of the development of
cities similarly derives from the bottom up.
An emergence-aware set of public interest principles would recognize that
limitations on users or uses of the network today - whether from government agencies or
market actors - forecloses possibilities in the future. To be sure, some of these benefits
can be described in terms of traditional economics or "modernized" antitrust, but many
cannot. Remarkably, the earliest norm-based and common-law requirements on
transportation infrastructure providers respected the emergence of that which it could not
271 Eric D. Beinhocker. The Origin Of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical Remaking of
Economics (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2006).
272 James J. Odell, "Agents and Complex Systems," Journal of Object Technology 1.2 (July-Aug. 2002):
35-45 <http://www.jot.fm/issues/issue 2002 07/column3>.
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predict. In the network society, the internet has become a parallel platform for emergent
innovation and expression.
CONCLUSION
The business of transporting communication is more than an economic enterprise.
The norms of English ports and the internet ethos share at least this assumption in
common. The business of broadband is a kind of public calling that brings with it public
obligations. It is a potential bottleneck for commerce and innovation that must remain
open in the interest of social welfare. It is public infrastructure and a type of common
good. These realities obligate access providers to deliver communications for all users
and for all uses, without imposing their own discriminatory preferences. It obligates the
government to find ways to catalyze build-out and connection - and to police providers
when their private interests are at cross-purposes with the ever-elusive public interest.
Our social definition of new technologies will influence how we regulate them.
Cable's early development, and the "Blue Sky" rhetoric, offers a case study. As Rowland
explains, unstated assumptions about the nature of a medium often guide formal
policy. 273 In Parson's words, social definitions "structurate" the policy decisions that
follow. 274 Pool explained how the one-way nature of early cable technology predisposed
it away from being subjected to non-discriminatory rules despite the eventual evolution
273 These assumptions remained "largely inviolate" even amidst the revolutionary language of the cable era.
William D. Rowland Jr. "The Process of Reification: Recent Trends in Communications Legislation and
Policy-Making." Journal of Communication 32.4 (Autumn 1982): 114-136, 116.
274 Parsons 2.
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toward broadband that he foresaw. 275 Streeter explains how public discourse and civil
society helped to support the myth of unbridled technology propelling us into limitless
multichannel abundance and a two-way global network.276
These scholars represent the intersection of media studies and communications
policy in the cable era. As the United States faces a similarly significant technology and
policy shift in the context of the internet, there is a need for similar disciplinary cross-
pollination. The way that we socially define the internet will inform the policy that
emerges. It need not be classified as a Title I, II, III, or VI service for us to articulate
fundamental principles. This does not mean that blindly believing in such principles will
make them so. In the case of cable, the promised instant two-way communication did not
appear until pressure from dial-up internet forced cable operators to innovate. The
internet and its ethos of openness has arguably moved us closer to "Blue Sky" ideals. Is
it foolish to think that we should appeal to the public interest in crafting broadband
policy?
I think not. It is clear that many historical implementations of the public interest
are mismatched with today's internet. Broadband is not broadcast. Broadcast is one-way
transmission whereas broadband is a truly two-way network. Broadband is also not
common carriage. The common carriage regime is premised on circuit-switched
technology and static use patterns. Broadband could continue to develop as a platform
for participatory communication that feeds democratic discourse, entrepreneurship, and
unanticipated new use. However, this path is far from secured. There is great temptation
for gatekeepers to close off these possibilities in the interest of short-term profit, and for
275 Pool 166-176.
276 Streeter, The Cable Fable 177.
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the government to misunderstand its role and commit regulatory sins of commission or
omission. Policymakers face the challenge of understanding the public interest values of
former media without blindly applying outmoded frameworks to new situations. They
must also resist the fear that any intervention is inherently inferior to market forces.
A holistic approach to media policy for the network society embraces public
interest obligations in the context of broadband as a business. Non-discrimination
preserves the voice of diverse speakers, encourages innovation, and facilitates free
markets. Universal access amplifies these benefits via network effects. Contemporary
debates over issues like network neutrality, spectrum allocation, and a national broadband
strategy are the fora in which we socially define the internet. Policy decisions that
recognize broadband as infrastructure will best reconcile our historical values of "the
public interest" with our evolving principles for the internet.
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